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A WORLD WITHOUT ROE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FUTURE OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY

JULIE C. SUK*
ABSTRACT
With the demise of Roe v. Wade, the survival of abortion access in
America will depend on new legal paths. In the same moment that
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has constrained
access to abortion in the United States, other constitutional democracies have moved in the opposite direction, expanding access to
safe, legal, and free abortions. They have done so without reasoning
from Roe’s vision of the private zone of unwanted pregnancy. The
development of abortion law outside the United States provides critical insights that can inform future efforts to vindicate the constitutional rights of women facing unwanted pregnancies. This Article
maps out the constitutional paths of reproductive justice in a world
without Roe.
Constitutional democracies around the world that have progressed from banning most abortions to legalizing many of them have
embraced the public dimensions of childbearing and childrearing.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Kathy Abrams,
Richard Albert, Joseph Blocher, Guy-Uriel Charles, Joshua Cohen, Deborah Dinner, Alice
Kessler-Harris, Suzanne Kim, Serena Mayeri, Sara McDougall, Melissa Murray, Elizabeth
Sepper, Reva Siegel, Sarah Song, Kirsten Swinth, and audiences at the American Society for
Legal History 2019 panel on “Sex and Motherhood Reimagined,” law school faculty workshops
at Duke, Fordham, Northwestern, and New York Law Schools, the Kadish Lecture at UC
Berkeley School of Law, the Comparative Constitutional Law Seminar at the University of
Texas School of Law for comments on the much earlier papers that evolved, with their many
helpful suggestions and criticisms, into this Article. Collaborating with Sarah Covington to
convene the CUNY conference on reproductive rights in the United States and Ireland in May
2019 was extremely generative to this project, especially the opportunity to engage leaders
of the movement to repeal the constitutional abortion ban in Ireland, most notably Ailbhe
Smyth. I am grateful to Julia Czyzowicz, Varshini Parthasarathy, and Angela Lulu Zhang for
providing excellent research assistance.
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Laws protecting abortion access have recently emerged from strong
pro-life constitutional baselines in several jurisdictions, including
the notable example of Ireland. Rather than constitutionalizing the
individual’s privacy interest in unwanted pregnancy, many constitutional orders recognize the social and public value of reproducing
the community, and the disproportionate role played by people who
stay pregnant and raise children in the production of these public
goods. Banning abortion effectively coerces people to contribute
disproportionate sacrifices to the State, without properly valuing
these contributions.
This Article shows how this insight from global abortion law
norms can be pursued in U.S. constitutional law. The formulation of
takings- and Thirteenth Amendment-based challenges to abortion
bans would focus on just compensation for the risks, burdens, and
sacrifices of compelled motherhood, beyond the enjoining of abortion
restrictions. Global experience also points to the importance of
incrementally establishing reasonable, expanded definitions of
medical necessity exceptions to abortion bans. Such avenues for
reestablishing abortion access, as well as public support for pregnancy and parenting, imagine a broader world of reproductive
justice than the one defined by Roe.
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INTRODUCTION
Can access to abortion survive in a world without Roe v. Wade?
After the Supreme Court’s decision to overrule Roe in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization,1 state laws banning nearly
all abortions have become enforceable.2 This Article shows how
access to abortion can become safe, legal, and free over time in a
world without Roe, by drawing on the contrasting logics of abortion
protections that have evolved in the world outside the United
States.
In the same moment that law has constrained access to abortion
in the United States, other constitutional democracies have moved
in the opposite direction, expanding access to safe, legal, and free
abortions.3 They have done so without reasoning from Roe’s vision
of the private nature of unwanted pregnancy.4 The development of
abortion law outside the United States provides critical insights
that can inform future efforts to vindicate the constitutional rights
of women facing unwanted pregnancies. This Article maps out new
paths within existing U.S. law for legal abortion access that can be
explored in the wake of Dobbs.
The law and politics of abortion around the world are not monolithic, as evidenced by the range of comparative and international
law amicus briefs filed in support of each side in Dobbs before the
Supreme Court.5 But the countries that permit broad legal access to
abortion generally do so without embracing Roe’s insistence that
pregnancy belongs to a fundamentally private sphere that is immune from governmental intervention.6
1. 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
2. See infra Part I.D.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See generally Brief of European Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392) (argued Dec.
1, 2021); Brief of 141 International Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Dobbs, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 19-1391) (argued Dec. 1, 2021); Brief of International and Comparative Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs, 141 S. Ct. 2619
(No. 19-1391) (argued Dec. 1, 2021); Brief of European Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 19-1391) (argued Dec. 1, 2021).
6. See infra Part II.
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This Article examines how constitutional democracies around the
world have progressed from banning most abortions to legalizing
many of them at the very same moment that the U.S. Supreme
Court has allowed states to ban almost all abortions. While global
constitutional norms cannot easily be transplanted to U.S. law, the
trajectories of jurisdictions that developed the right to abortion
access from strong pro-life baselines could inform the alternatives
to Roe by which abortion access could be reimagined and reestablished in America. The transnational embrace of the public, rather
than private, dimensions of unwanted pregnancy is the generative
move worth studying. A full appreciation of the State’s interest in
pregnancy and parenthood might guide the formulation of new
constitutional arguments under the Takings Clause, or, to a lesser
extent, the Thirteenth Amendment ban on involuntary servitude, to
reinforce the State’s constitutional duties to citizens who face unwanted pregnancies. Drawing on emerging legal principles around
surrogacy and property interests in one’s body, these arguments
articulate what the State owes to the people who make future
generations possible by bearing the bodily risks, burdens, and
sacrifices required to turn unborn life into born citizens, workers,
and persons—sometimes unwillingly.
In the world of abortion access without Roe, restrictions on
abortion are illegitimate, not because they violate privacy or even
equal protection of the laws, but because they manifest the government’s failure to properly value the shared public benefits of
human reproduction.7 By effectively forcing women to continue
unwanted pregnancies to term, abortion bans enable the State to
protect unborn life and to spawn its next generation of citizens and
workers to the enrichment of society as a whole.8 The State relies on
people who become pregnant to absorb disproportionate risks,
burdens, and costs to generate this collective benefit.9 Unlike other
people who are conscripted to defend and enlarge the State and
society, pregnant people are generally not compensated for their
contributions.10
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.

2022]

CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY

449

The idea that the State unjustly extracts this value out of pregnant persons by banning abortions is developed in the abortion
jurisprudence of some European courts. Ireland’s recent processes
of amending its constitutional protection of unborn life to legalize
abortion in a range of circumstances are particularly instructive.11
The abortion liberalization amendment paved the way to additional processes by which the people participated in proposing reform
of the Irish constitution’s provision protecting mothers, towards
gender-equal protections for childrearing work.12
Drawing on comparative constitutional law, this Article imagines
the world of abortion access after and without Roe, exploring
takings, the Thirteenth Amendment ban on involuntary servitude,
and strategies for reasonable expansion of the life and health
exceptions to abortion bans as potential anchors for reproductive
justice as a constitutional principle, a constitutional commitment
that reaches beyond abortion rights.
Part I charts the evolution of the American constitutional right to
abortion, from Roe to Dobbs. Roe grounded the right to abortion in
substantive due process privacy rights13 and was limited in its
ability to make abortion access real for the women most vulnerable
to the negative consequences of continuing an unwanted pregnancy.
Exploiting the weaknesses of Roe’s privacy reasoning, Dobbs overruled the longstanding constitutional barrier to state laws banning
abortion, which became enforceable. Part II examines the constitutional law of abortion access in peer democracies, from the frameworks that emerged in most of Europe since Roe, to the transformations in pro-life countries that decriminalized abortion in recent
years, such as Ireland, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and South
Korea.
Part III focuses on two case studies—Germany and Ireland—that
demonstrate the common thread in laws liberalizing abortion
around the world: the understanding of unwanted pregnancy as a
public problem for which the State bears responsibility, rather than
a purely private matter as in Roe. The German constitutional court
twice rejected abortion on demand, contemporaneously with Roe and
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

450

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:443

Casey, while envisioning the situations in which women’s autonomy
required abortion access. In Ireland, the constitutional amendment
of 2018 paved the way to legislation protecting abortion access, after
decades of public engagement of tragic situations of pregnancy.
These constitutional democracies have embraced strong State involvement in all stages of pregnancy and parenthood.14 Ironically,
this strong-State approach has made abortion more accessible to
poor women than it was in the United States under Roe.15
Finally, Part IV suggests ways of transposing these insights from
the world of legal abortion outside of the United States, identifying
the unique opportunities within U.S. law and legal institutions.
What would it mean for the State to fully recognize, compensate,
and value the risks and sacrifices sustained by women due to
unwanted pregnancies? Future challenges to the new near-total
abortion bans, including Texas’s S.B. 8, could reason from the logic
of regulatory takings and/or involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. In addition, litigation could seek to define, in
a reasonable and empathetic expansion, the “medical emergency”
exceptions that have been written into the laws banning abortion.
I. THE END OF ROE AND ITS PRIVACY RATIONALE
A. Dobbs and Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court justified its decision to overrule Roe v. Wade
on the grounds that “the Constitution makes no reference to
abortion.”16 A major weakness of Roe, according to Justice Alito
writing for the five-Justice majority, was that “the abortion right,
which is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right to
privacy, which is also not mentioned.”17 The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, on which Roe relied, protected “some
rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution,” but not abortion.18 The majority regarded Roe as “egregiously wrong and deeply

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.C.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022).
Id. at 2245.
Id. at 2242.
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damaging,” “outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation of
the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely pointed,”
and “on a collision course with the Constitution from the day it was
decided.”19 According to the Dobbs Court, the Supreme Court’s cases
protecting abortion rights, from Roe to Casey, mistakenly located
those rights in the “liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, the majority held that rights
that were not explicitly enumerated should only be constitutionally
protected if they were “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition”
and “essential to our Nation’s ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’”20 Drawing
on legal sources spanning from thirteenth-century England21 to the
United States in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification
in the nineteenth century indicating that abortion was criminalized,22 the Court concluded that the right to abortion was not deeply
rooted in our nation’s history and tradition and thus should never
have been protected by Roe.23
The Dobbs majority also found Roe’s reliance on the “right of
personal privacy” inadequate because Roe conflated different meanings, from privacy in personal information to personal decisionmaking about family matters.24 Ultimately, Dobbs’s justification for
ending the right to abortion was that Roe—the case that established
the constitutional right to abortion in the first place— had these
“well-known” weaknesses in reasoning.25 In sum, the Dobbs Court
characterized Roe’s effort to connect abortion to privacy as tenuous
and cast doubt on efforts of prior substantive due process cases to
connect privacy to the Constitution’s text and history.
B. Roe’s Logic of Privacy in the Body and the Family
Dobbs’s skepticism of Roe’s privacy rationale must be taken seriously. Indeed, it is Roe’s outcome, not its reasoning, that led Roe
19. Id. at 2265.
20. Id. at 2246 (alteration in original) (quoting Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 672, 686
(2019)).
21. See id. at 2249.
22. Id. at 2252-53.
23. See id. at 2253.
24. Id. at 2267-68.
25. Id. at 2266.
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v. Wade to become a shorthand for the legality of almost all
abortions before viability. Roe invalidated a Texas law that banned
and criminalized abortion in most circumstances.26 But Roe’s
reasoning was limited, not only because of its loose nexus with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s text but also because it decriminalized
abortion without supporting access to abortion.
The Roe Court concluded that the U.S. Constitution protected a
pregnant woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy without governmental interference, invoking privacy.27 “[A] right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution,” the Court noted.28 Prior to the viability of
the fetus, the State could not constitutionally regulate the determination, made by a woman and her doctor, to terminate a pregnancy.29
Although Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Roe Court featured
abortion’s medical-legal history30 and mentioned the bodily health
hazards of both pregnancy and abortion,31 some discussions of privacy in Roe centered on the personal nature of the childbearing
decision, rather than the zone of privacy in the body.32 The Court
located the right to privacy in prior cases33 involving compelled
medical exams in the course of civil litigation,34 involuntary sterilization,35 childrearing,36 the home,37 marriage,38 and birth control.39

26. 410 U.S. 113, 117-18, 166 (1973).
27. See id. at 153, 163-64, 166.
28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 163.
30. See id. at 116-17, 129-47.
31. See id. at 148-50.
32. See id. at 152-54 (“[I]t is not clear to [the Court] that the claim ... that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated.”).
33. Id. at 152-53.
34. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 250, 252 (1891) (“To compel any one,
and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity.”).
35. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536-37, 541-42 (1942).
36. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925).
37. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-76, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
38. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965).
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court struck down a statute
prohibiting unmarried people from obtaining contraceptives on
equal protection grounds and acknowledged that “[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”40 In Roe, Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion more explicitly tied the “personal intimacy” of the abortion right
to “the right to send a child to private school” and “the right to teach
a foreign language” to one’s child.41 Parents’ decisions about how to
raise a child are, therefore, under constitutional precedents, protected from State intrusion. Roe shielded the individual’s decision
to have a child at all (or not) from State intrusion as well.
Roe influenced subsequent cases involving childbearing and
childrearing, as the Court strengthened the proposition that having
a child is a personal and privately exercised freedom worthy of
protection from State intrusion. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, Justice Stewart authored the Supreme Court’s opinion in
a decision invalidating several public school districts’ policies of
requiring any pregnant teacher to go on unpaid maternity leave at
least five months prior to the anticipated birth of her baby and until
her baby was at least three months old.42 “[T]here is a right ‘to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a
child,’” the Court noted.43 Requiring the pregnant working woman
to go on unpaid maternity leave punished the woman for choosing
to bear a child, therefore constituting an unwarranted intrusion by
the State into this personal choice.44

40. 405 U.S. 438, 440-41, 443, 453 (1972).
41. 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351 F.
Supp. 224, 227 (Conn. 1972)).
42. 414 U.S. 632, 634-35, 647-48 (1974).
43. Id. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453). For a detailed history of the litigation
in light of the history of teachers’ struggles for the right to return to work after childbirth, see
generally Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343
(2010). For a discussion of mandatory maternity leave in comparative perspective, see
generally Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010).
44. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640, 647-48.
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What ties together these different ideas of personal privacy
invoked in Roe to protect abortion is the idea of privacy as a negative right to be free from State intervention, not a positive right to
State protection or support. Subsequent cases established a broad
negative right to enable bodily and family autonomy, but no state
support to make this autonomy real, particularly for indigent
women whose lives are likely to be severely burdened by an unwanted pregnancy.
In Harris v. McRae, Medicaid recipients challenged congressional
appropriations legislation, known as the Hyde Amendment, which
made federal funds unavailable to reimburse abortions provided to
indigent recipients of Medicaid, even when those abortions were
medically necessary to prevent long-lasting physical injury to the
pregnant woman.45 Initially, the Hyde Amendment also excluded
funding to terminate pregnancies resulting from rape or incest, and
it only authorized funding for abortions necessary to save the
pregnant woman’s life.46 The Supreme Court upheld the legislative
ban on abortion funding without backpedaling Roe’s privacy-based
right to abortion.47 “[A]lthough government may not place obstacles
in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need
not remove those not of its own creation,” the Court explained.48
“Indigency falls in the latter category.”49 The Court held that
“[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with
freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does
not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom.”50 It thus became clear
that Roe v. Wade protected a broad negative right to abortion: it
made abortion legal and perhaps safe, but not free.
Likewise, the right to choose to bear a child, championed by the
Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, in no

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See 448 U.S. 297, 300-03 (1980).
See id. at 302-03.
See id. at 316-17, 326-27.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 317-18.
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way entails a constitutional right to state support for childbirth
or maternity. The only solution to the unconstitutionality of mandatory unpaid maternity leave in that case was to enjoin the policy
and permit the pregnant teachers to teach as long as they chose51—
not to establish a constitutional right of pregnant teachers to compensation for mandatory maternity leave or otherwise establish a
constitutional right to paid maternity leave.
And indeed, the Supreme Court rejected efforts by pregnant
women to establish a right to paid maternity leave in public law. In
Geduldig v. Aiello, litigants who had been pregnant or had recently
given birth challenged a state disability benefits scheme that authorized paid leave for every work-disabling condition except for
normal pregnancy and childbirth.52 The Supreme Court upheld the
policy over a constitutional challenge alleging that the denial of
these paid statutory benefits in the event of a normal pregnancy and
childbirth violated the Equal Protection Clause.53 The decision was
authored by Justice Stewart,54 whose Roe concurrence55 and LaFleur
majority opinion56 treated childbearing and childrearing as so intimate and personal as to render state involvement improper.
In the cases involving pregnancy that followed Roe, it became
clear that the American constitutional right to choose one’s reproductive future—whether to terminate or to continue a pregnancy—
is negative, not positive. The State has a duty to leave such
decisions up to individuals, but it does not have a duty to support
either of these choices or to help people achieve the conditions
necessary to carrying out either choice. Roe’s protection of a negative liberty right to freedom from state interference, rather than
the positive liberty right to free actualization, is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s overall approach to the life, liberty, and property
51. See 414 U.S. 632, 645-48 (1974).
52. See 417 U.S. 484, 486, 488-89 (1974).
53. Id. at 486, 490, 497.
54. Id. at 486. Deborah Dinner points out that the majority opinion reflected a concern
that the claim for paid maternity leave would pose a threat to the solvency of the California
disability insurance program. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 467 (2011). For Dinner,
this case and others related to pregnancy discrimination and parental leave reveal ambivalences about sharing and redistributing the costs of reproduction. See id. at 417-18, 422.
55. See 410 U.S. 113, 168-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. See 414 U.S. at 639-40, 643, 646-48.
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enshrined in the Due Process Clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court said that
the State did not violate the Constitution when it failed to protect
a young boy from severe, violent physical abuse at the hands of his
own father, resulting over time in the boy’s permanent brain
damage.57 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of life, liberty,
and property forbids the State from itself attacking people’s life,
liberty, or property, but it does not “impose an affirmative obligation
on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.”58
C. The Limits of Privacy for Reproductive Justice
Proponents of abortion rights in the legal academy have pointed
to the inadequacies of the negative privacy right protected by Roe.
This Subsection describes the critiques of Roe and its privacy logic
by leading feminist legal theorists and Black feminists from the
standpoint of reproductive justice and shows how similar ideas
were invoked without being fully developed in Roe and Casey.
Robin West has suggested that Roe’s negative right to abortion
has promoted an antigovernmental stance in matters of childbearing and childrearing. On her account, the right to abortion protected
by Roe v. Wade is at odds with a capacious feminist understanding
of reproductive justice.59 Roe’s negative privacy right keeps the State
out of family life, preventing both a robust role for government in
childcare and heightened protections against domestic violence.60
Critical race feminists, most notably Dorothy Roberts, have
argued that the pro-choice focus on the negative right to abortion
has eclipsed the broader principles of reproductive justice in which
Black women have more at stake:
[C]ritical race feminists advocate a more complicated understanding of reproductive freedom that extends beyond the
myopic focus on legalized abortion to encompass a broader
57. 489 U.S. 189, 191, 193 (1989).
58. Id. at 195.
59. See Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1422 (2009).
60. Id. at 1422.
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human right to reproductive self-determination and well-being.
Reproductive justice includes the right to have a child, under the
conditions desired by the one giving birth, the right not to have
a child and the right to parent any children one has in a healthy,
safe and supportive environment.61

Roberts has argued that the equation of “reproductive rights” and
the negative “right to an abortion” primarily reflects the concern of
white, middle-class women.62 By contrast, poor Black women’s
choices are “limited not only by the denial of access to safe abortions, but also by the lack of resources necessary for a healthy
pregnancy and parenting relationship.”63
Khiara Bridges has noted that the constitutional protection of
privacy in the body and family life, while a useful concept for all
women, has seldom helped poor women and women of color: “[F]or
the marginalized, indigent women who must turn to the state for
assistance if they are to achieve healthy pregnancies and infants,
privacy is a concept of great significance; indeed, the devastating
absence of privacy may be that which distinguishes their experiences with the state from their monied counterparts.”64
Bridges draws on the insights of Martha Fineman, who exposed
the dynamic by which families become “public” rather than “private” in the American legal order when the father becomes absent;
any family headed by an unmarried mother becomes a “public family” subject to the State’s intervention.65 How does improving the
negative right to privacy for all, including the most vulnerable,
compare to improving the State’s interventions relative to the
“public family,” as responses to the oppressive disparities? To the
extent that Roe endeavored to keep the government out of pregnancy and parenthood, especially before fetal viability, it also

61. Dorothy E. Roberts, Critical Race Feminism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 112, 124 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
62. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 4, 300 (1997).
63. Id. at 300.
64. Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113,
122 (2016).
65. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 178, 180, 184-85, 189-92 (1995).
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erected a barrier to government support for the reproductive lives
of poor women, whether they chose to bear or not bear children.
If anything, the privacy framing of reproductive choice entrenched the least generous state response to the overwhelming burdens
of pregnancy, especially for poor or unmarried women.66 The unbearable burdens of unwanted pregnancy did not escape the Supreme Court’s notice in Roe.67 Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the
Court justified the privacy right in part due to the importance of
medical privacy, particularly when the pregnancy threatens to cause
economic ruin or social stigma:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman
a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into
a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician
necessarily will consider in consultation.68

Despite insisting that privacy was the solution, these remarks in
Roe appear aware of the social dimension of the decision to bear a
child. The decision is shaped by a woman’s relationships, not only
with the child’s father, but also with a social, economic, and legal
order full of other people who may or may not provide the approval,
support, or opportunities needed to lead a decent life as a mother.
But the Roe decision and its progeny continued to insist that reproduction was fundamentally private and that state regulation of it
was inappropriate.69
Twenty years later, when the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe’s
right to terminate a pregnancy before viability in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,70 it acknowledged a
66. See, e.g., id. at 190-92.
67. See 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 153-54; Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 6970 (1976).
70. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
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stronger state interest in reproduction than it had in Roe.71 Instead
of saying, as Roe appeared to, that all state involvement in the first
trimester was unconstitutional, Casey permitted the State to attempt to persuade the pregnant woman to continue the pregnancy,
in recognition of the state’s interest in protecting unborn life.72
Furthermore, regulations that were efforts to persuade or deter
could not impose an undue burden on the woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy.73
The joint opinion for the Court by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter concluded that women would be unduly burdened by a
law requiring spousal notification before an abortion.74 They justified that conclusion with a substantial discussion of domestic
violence data, including spousal abuse.75 Casey also evidenced a
heightened awareness of the disproportionate sacrifices women
sustain in pregnancy, which affect women’s prospects for a decent
life:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.
That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race
been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the
eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone
be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and
our culture.76

The Court suggested that, by its very nature, pregnancy involves
enough risk, forbearance, pain, sacrifice, and suffering that the
State cannot insist upon a woman continuing it.77

71. See id. at 877. As Mary Ziegler notes, “Casey put the costs and benefits of both
abortion and laws regulating it at the center of constitutional discourse.” MARY ZIEGLER,
ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 119 (2020).
72. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 871-73.
73. See id. at 876-78.
74. See id. at 841, 887-95.
75. Id. at 888-94.
76. Id. at 852.
77. See id.
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Justice Blackmun, reprising his remarks in Roe about the
distressful life and stigma that motherhood could engender, put the
point slightly differently in his concurring and dissenting opinion78:
A State’s restrictions on a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender
equality. State restrictions on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State does not
compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes that
they owe this duty as a matter of course.79

Justice Blackmun planted an interesting question without taking it
up: What if the State did compensate women for their conscripted
services, in the same way that the State pays people for jury duty
and military service? Would that change the analysis on whether
the State could restrict abortion? In invoking gender equality, Justice Blackmun pointed out the equal protection problem in regulating abortion: “This assumption—that women can simply be forced
to accept the ‘natural’ status and incidents of motherhood— appears
to rest upon a conception of women’s role that has triggered the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause.”80
A question that lurks but is never asked in Casey, and even
earlier in LaFleur, is whether compensation for the sacrifices of
motherhood—such as paid maternity leave in LaFleur—would
remedy the constitutional violation. Justice Blackmun’s formulation—“the State conscripts women’s bodies”81—invites the analogy
between motherhood and military conscription.82 Would restricting
78. Unlike the Justices in the Joint Opinion, Justice Blackmun would have struck down
all of the regulations at issue in Casey, including the twenty-four-hour waiting period and
the parental notification requirement. See id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 928 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. This analogy is frequently made. See generally, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1995).
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abortion pose an equal protection problem if the State valued and
compensated motherhood comparably to the military service
historically performed by men—service which also involves risks to
one’s life, pain, suffering, trauma, and sacrifice, sometimes unwanted and coerced—as in the case of the military draft? If an extensive and humane governmental infrastructure of compensation
and support for mothers and children existed—analogous to what
veterans and military draftees receive—would the government’s
regulation of abortion be less burdensome and reasonably within
the range of duties that fully equal citizens of a polity could be
expected to bear for the public good of building and expanding a
flourishing society across generations?
These questions expand the frame on the distributive injustice
of restricting abortion that constitutional litigation attempted to
reduce. When the State decides that maternity healthcare, paid
maternity leave, pregnant workers’ economic security, or early
childcare and education are none of its business, it fails to take
responsibility for the children who will be born and raised to constitute its soldiers, workers, and leaders, and unevenly distributes
the costs on women, who then shoulder the disproportionate health
risks, pain, and labor necessary to produce the State’s next generation of citizens. In prohibiting abortion, the State coerces women’s
sacrifices for the social and public good. The State extracts collective
benefits from its female citizens without compensating them the
way it compensates men who defend the nation’s security through
compulsory military service. That extraction is the core of reproductive injustice. In fact, Reva Siegel has questioned whether governments that purport to be pro-life deserve the label when they
restrict abortion while doing nothing to help women bring a wanted
pregnancy to term.83
Justice Blackmun’s suggestion that abortion restrictions conscript
women into motherhood without compensation deserves fuller development. Greater attention must be paid to what makes pregnancies unwanted for so many American women. Often, pregnancies
are unwanted because social conditions and public policy fail to

83. See Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It
Matters in Law and Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 207-09 (2018).
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prevent the losses that women absorb by staying pregnant.84 Part
IV will suggest some legal avenues by which this problem can be
addressed. Without Roe’s privacy-based constitutional right to
abortion, new legal paths for reproductive justice will be needed,
particularly as new state laws banning or restricting abortion get
adopted or go into effect.
D. State Abortion Bans After Dobbs
Several state laws that ban or restrict abortion are now in effect
because of Roe’s overruling. The immediate legal effect of the Dobbs
decision was that lower court orders enjoining Mississippi’s fifteenweek abortion ban were reversed, allowing that law to be enforced.85
Without Roe, the only constitutional barrier to any state laws that
ban abortion before viability, whether at fifteen weeks or at the
detection of a fetal heartbeat (around six weeks), is rational basis
review.86 In Mississippi, the legislature had adopted a law in 2007
to go into effect if Roe was overruled that prohibited most abortions
from the moment of conception.87 The Attorney General of Mississippi certified the “trigger law” three days after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dobbs, announcing that it would likely pass the rational
basis review.88
While Dobbs was pending, Texas passed S.B. 8, which banned
abortions upon detection of a fetal heartbeat.89 Because S.B. 8
imposed no criminal penalties and was enforced by civil lawsuits for
damages by any person,90 abortion providers’ efforts to enjoin it
through litigation had failed because there were no defendants that
were amenable to suit.91 Therefore, S.B. 8 went into effect because
84. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
85. See 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2285 (2022).
86. Id. at 2283-84.
87. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-45(2) (2022).
88. Kate Royals & Will Stribling, Fitch Certifies Mississippi’s Trigger Law Banning Abortion in Nearly All Cases, MISS. TODAY (June 27, 2022), https://mississippitoday.org/2022/06/27/
fitch-certifies-mississippis-trigger-law-banning-abortion-in-nearly-all-cases/ [https://perma.cc/
J6XY-VP58]. Efforts to enjoin the trigger law in litigation have failed as of this writing.
89. S.B. 8, § 3, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
90. See id.
91. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021) (rejecting abortion
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its procedural design evaded judicial review under Roe. In the
absence of Roe, S.B. 8’s novel enforcement provisions are no longer
necessary for its survival, because Dobbs holds that “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating
or prohibiting abortion” through their state legislatures.92 As a
result, Texas’s “trigger law,” which the legislature adopted in 2021
providing that it would become effective if Roe was overruled, went
into effect.93 This law, the Human Life Protection Act, bans abortion
from conception to birth and authorizes criminal penalties for
first- or second-degree felonies,94 as well as civil penalties enforceable by the Attorney General of not less than $100,000 for each
violation.95
Several states had passed abortion bans similar to the Mississippi law upheld in Dobbs, as well as more restrictive fetal heartbeat bans in recent years. Before Dobbs, federal courts cited Roe
to enjoin abortion bans in Georgia,96 Alabama,97 Arkansas,98
Missouri,99 Kentucky,100 Mississippi,101 North Dakota,102 Ohio,103
providers’ application for a stay); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 13 F.4th 434, 443 (5th
Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding that state officials, judges, and court clerks could not be sued
to challenge S.B. 8 due to their lack of enforcement authority under the statute), aff ’d, 142
S. Ct. 522 (2021); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 23 F.4th 380, 389 (5th Cir. 2022)
(certifying question to Texas Supreme Court as to whether Texas licensing officials are authorized by state law to enforce S.B. 8, which would make them amenable to suit), mandamus
denied, 142 S. Ct. 701 (2022); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569, 583 (Tex.
2022) (holding that Texas law does not authorize state officials on the Texas Medical Board
to enforce the Texas Heartbeat Act).
92. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022).
93. H.B. 1280, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
94. Id. §§ 1-2.
95. Id. § 2.
96. Sistersong Women of Color Reprod. Just. Collective v. Kemp, 472 F. Supp. 3d 1297,
1328 (N.D. Ga. 2020), appeal filed.
97. Robinson v. Marshall, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1059 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
98. Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
99. Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson,
389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 640 (W.D. Mo. 2019), aff’d, 1 F.4th 552 (8th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 2021
WL 4509073 (U.S. 2021).
100. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Beshear, No. 3:19-CV-178-DJH, 2019 WL 9047174,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 20, 2019).
101. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 951 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam).
102. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2015).
103. Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 394 F. Supp. 3d 796, 804 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (granting
preliminary injunction).
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South Carolina,104 and Tennessee105 in lawsuits brought by abortion
providers. After Dobbs, these state heartbeat bans are enforceable,
and “trigger laws” that ban abortion from the moment of conception,
except to save the pregnant woman’s life, have come into effect.106
Without Roe, abortion bans that Roe made unenforceable are presumed to be valid; in Arizona, a state court recognized the validity
of the pre-Roe abortion statute upon legal action by the Attorney
General.107
The Mississippi statute upheld in Dobbs made an exception to the
fifteen-week abortion ban for “a medical emergency or in the case
of a severe fetal abnormality,” and its definition of “medical emergency” was limited to life-threatening physical disorders, illnesses,
or injuries.108 The Texas Human Life Protection Act that took effect
after Dobbs also makes an exception when
[T]he pregnant female on whom the abortion is performed,
induced, or attempted has a life-threatening physical condition
aggravated by, caused by, or arising from a pregnancy that
places the female at risk of death or poses a serious risk of
substantial impairment of a major bodily function unless the
abortion is performed or induced.109

The Mississippi trigger law that went into effect after Dobbs bans
all abortions except those “necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life or where the pregnancy was caused by rape,”110 with
104. Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. Wilson, 520 F. Supp. 3d 823, 827 (D.S.C. 2021), aff ’d,
26 F.4th 600 (4th Cir. 2022).
105. Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, 14 F.4th 409, 437 (6th Cir. 2021), vacated,
18 F.4th 550 (6th Cir. 2021).
106. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-304(a) (2022); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.772(2)(a),
(3)(a), (4) (West 2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.017(1), (4)(1) (2022); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.1061(A)(1), (C), (F)-(G) (2018); 2022 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 133 § 1-2 (S.B. 1555)
(West); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-5.1 (2022); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-213(b), (c)(2), (d)
(2022); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-45(2) (2022); H.B. 1280, § 2-3, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2021); see also State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 24,
2022), https://www.gutt macher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions
[https://perma.cc/H4VF-Y5KZ].
107. Planned Parenthood Ctr. of Tucson v. Brnovich, No. C127867, slip op. at 1-3, 6-7 (Ariz.
Superior Ct., Pima Cnty. Sept. 22, 2022).
108. Gestational Age Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191(3)(j), (4)(b) (2018).
109. H.B. 1280, § 2, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
110. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-45(2) (2022).
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the rape exception only applying “if a formal charge of rape has
been filed with an appropriate law enforcement official.”111
There is a genuine question of whether the Mississippi abortion
ban would have been upheld under the rational basis test that the
Dobbs majority applied if the abortion ban had not included the
medical emergency exception. The Dobbs majority held that a law
regulating abortion “must be sustained if there is a rational basis on
which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.”112 Those legitimate interests include, inter
alia, “respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of
development,” and “the protection of maternal health and safety.”113
Because the majority does not discuss it, it remains an open question as to how rational basis review would resolve a conflict between
protecting prenatal life and protecting maternal health.
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan’s dissenting opinion in
Dobbs asks:
Must a state law allow abortions when necessary to protect a
woman’s life and health? And if so, exactly when? How much
risk to a woman’s life can a State force her to incur, before the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life kicks in? Suppose a
patient with pulmonary hypertension has a 30-to-50 percent risk
of dying with ongoing pregnancy; is that enough? And short of
death, how much illness or injury can the State require her to
accept, consistent with the Amendment’s protection of liberty
and equality?114

Dobbs upheld a statute that had an exception in place to save the
pregnant person’s life. The question of whether such an exception
for allowable abortions is necessary for an abortion ban to be upheld, and the scope of any such exception consistent with the
pregnant person’s enumerated Fourteenth Amendment right to life,
remains open.115 In several countries that did not constitutionalize
the right to abortion as Roe did in the United States, the process of
111. Id. § 41-41-45(3).
112. 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2336-37 (Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
115. I address ways in which these medical emergency provisions can be construed and
expanded through litigation in Part IV.B.
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asking and answering these complex questions in courts, legislatures, citizens’ assemblies, and referenda has, over time, paved
alternative paths to protecting access to more abortions than
currently allowed by the new state abortion bans in the United
States.
II. EMERGING GLOBAL CONSENSUS NORMS ON ABORTION ACCESS
Other democracies’ evolutions towards abortion access occurred
in the context of their growing appreciation of the complex burdens
and risks of pregnancy as well as an acceptance of state responsibility for the social and public dimensions of biological and social
reproduction. While many liberal democracies restrict the negative
right to abortion to a greater extent than Roe would allow, they
protect a broader positive right to abortion than Roe required, by
ensuring that those justified abortions permitted by law are safe
and free, as well as decriminalized. This Part provides a brief overview of recent court decisions and legislation expanding abortion
access in several countries that previously enforced abortion bans
similar to those that have gone into effect in several states after
Dobbs. It then describes the “indications” approach upon which
many European countries have converged.
A. Recent Evolutions from Protecting the Unborn to Protecting
Abortion Access
It is particularly striking to observe the regimes of abortion access emerging recently in countries that have strong pro-life
histories, such as Ireland.116 While they fall short of the on-demand
abortion that Roe prescribed before viability, they make abortions
more safe, legal, and free than the state abortion bans that have
become enforceable after Dobbs.117 The abortion laws of the rest of
the world occupy the space between Roe v. Wade and current state

116. See infra Part III.B.
117. Compare generally Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act No.
31/2018) (Ir.), https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/31/enacted/en/html [https://perma.
cc/BM2Q-S3B3], with MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-45 (2022), and H.B. 1280, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2021).
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abortion bans, where most of the popular sentiment also resides.118
Understanding that space is critical for reimagining a better future for unwanted pregnancy under the U.S. Constitution.
During the same period in recent years when nearly one-third of
the states passed “heartbeat” abortion restrictions, several other
constitutional democracies have repudiated their prior laws restricting abortion in favor of safe and legal abortion access, even
after the detection of fetal cardiac activity. Countries with significant Catholic histories and populations, most notably Ireland,
experienced a dramatic sea change from the constitutionally
required penalization of abortion to protect unborn life,119 towards
the constitutionally permitted protection of safe and free abortion
on demand in the first trimester.120 Dialogue among courts adjudicating constitutional norms and legislatures implementing those
norms through public policy has paved the way to abortion access
that is more responsive to concerns of reproductive and distributive
justice than the Roe-Casey framework has ever been. As of 2022,
Irish law permits and funds more substantial access to abortion
than does the law under Texas’s near-total abortion ban or other
states’ “heartbeat” statutes that emerged contemporaneously with
the transformation of Irish abortion law.121
Ireland is not alone in opening up abortion access. Several Latin
American countries have also recently seen significant shifts from
criminal abortion bans to constitutional abortion access. In February 2022, the Constitutional Court of Colombia held that the
criminalization of abortions, including elective abortions, prior to
twenty-four weeks of gestation, was unconstitutional.122 This landmark decision invalidated the criminal abortion statute.123 While

118. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.
119. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
120. See Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018, § 12 (Act No. 31/2018)
(Ir.).
121. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
122. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 21, 2022, Sentencia C055/22, Comunicado de prensa [C.P.] (vol. 5, pg. 1) (Colom.).
123. Id.
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the court’s judgment leaves open the possibility of governmental
regulation of abortion prior to twenty-four weeks without criminalization,124 the unconstitutionality of criminalization ended the
regime under which some women choosing to terminate their pregnancies were still being imprisoned.125
In September 2021, the Supreme Court of Mexico unanimously
rendered a historic decision invalidating the near-total ban on
abortion in the Penal Code of Coahuila.126 While recognizing that
the interest in protecting fetal life increased with the time of
gestation, a state’s measures to protect the fetus had to be limited,
to some degree, by the rights of women and gestating persons to
reproductive freedom.127
In 2020, the Argentine Parliament ended its longstanding criminalization of almost all abortions by adopting a landmark law
establishing the right of “women and persons of other gender identity with the ability to gestate” to choose abortion up to fourteen
weeks’ gestation, to access abortion care in the health system, to
receive post-abortion services in the health system, and to prevent
unwanted pregnancies with access to information, sex education,
and effective contraceptives.128 Beyond the fourteen-week line, the
new Argentine statute permits abortions if the pregnancy is the
result of a criminal violation, or if it endangers the life or whole
health of the pregnant person.129
These developments grew out of earlier judicial decisions that
underscored the constitutional stakes of abortion access without
enforcing rights to abortion on demand. In 2006, the Constitutional
Court of Colombia ruled that the criminal statute prohibiting
abortions in all circumstances violated women’s fundamental
124. See id. (vol. 5, pg. 2).
125. See Laura Gottesdiener, “Feeling Free”: Women Criminalized by Mexico’s Abortion
Bans Celebrate Ruling, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2021, 10:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/
americas/feeling-free-women-criminalized-by-mexicos-abortion-bans-celebrate-ruling-2021-0909/ [https://perma.cc/6TAS-JAEA].
126. Acción de inconstitucionalidad, Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN], 148/2017, página
160-61 (Mex.).
127. Press Release, Supreme Corte de Justicia, Mexican Supreme Court: Landmark Decisions at the Vanguard for Reproductive Rights Worldwide (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.
internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=6606 [https://perma.cc/4FCZ-EKCF].
128. Law No. 27610, Dec. 30, 2020, B.O., art. 2, 4-6 (Arg.).
129. Id. art. 4.
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rights.130 Invoking the 1991 constitution and international human
rights law, the constitutional court noted that the state’s protection
of fetal interests imposed a disproportionate burden on women.131
The legislature, in enacting a criminal law, “cannot ignore that a
woman is a human being entitled to dignity and that she must be
treated as such, as opposed to being treated as a reproductive
instrument for the human race.”132 Therefore, abortion could not be
criminalized in the following circumstances: (1) when the continuation of the pregnancy presents a risk to the life or physical or
mental health of the woman, (2) when there are serious malformations that make the fetus nonviable, and (3) when the pregnancy is
the result of rape, incest, unwanted artificial insemination, or
unwanted implantation of the fertilized ovule.133
While the court entertained the possibility that some abortions
could remain criminalized, it held that the legislature could not
“require a complete sacrifice of any individual’s fundamental right
in order to serve the general interests of society or in order to give
legal priority to other protected values.”134 While acknowledging a
privacy interest, the Constitutional Court of Colombia emphasized
the constitutional problem of requiring disproportionate individual
sacrifices for the public good.135
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Argentina took a step towards
abortion liberalization by affirming lower courts’ refusal to apply
criminal sanctions in the case of an abortion performed on a fifteenyear-old girl who had been raped by her stepfather.136 The criminal
statute prohibiting nearly all abortions made an exception for rape
or sexual assault of mentally deficient or insane women, thereby

130. See C-355/06, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA (May 10, 2006), https://www.
corteconstitucional.gov.co/english/Decision.php?IdPublicacion=9219 [https://perma.cc/AC7QQVCK].
131. See id.
132. MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LEADING CASES 75 (2017) (providing excerpted English translation of 2006 Colombian
abortion case).
133. See C-355/06, supra note 130.
134. ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 132, at 75.
135. See id.
136. Argentine Court Decriminalises Abortion in Rape Cases, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-17360739 [https://perma.cc/A9G4-SLSJ].
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calling into question the abortion that took place in that case.137 By
reasonably extending the exception to apply to a teenage rape
victim, the court created a small space from which larger mobilizations could grow.
The Constitutional Court of Korea has also recently expanded
abortion access. The country had criminalized abortion since 1953,
and the court was perhaps less motivated by public Christian morality and more motivated by a postwar nation-building and population growth agenda.138 In 2019, the Constitutional Court of Korea
also issued a landmark decision concluding that the criminal
abortion statute did not conform to the constitution.139 The Korean
statute had permitted abortions in more circumstances than those
at issue in Colombia and Argentina: it authorized abortions up to
twenty-four weeks’ gestation for pregnancies that resulted from
rape, quasi-rape, or incest; where the putative parents suffer from
eugenic or genetic disability or disease; where the pregnant woman
or spouse suffered from any specified contagious disease; and when
maintaining the pregnancy was likely to severely injure the pregnant woman’s health.140
An abortion provider challenged the statute, asserting the rights
of pregnant women to choose abortion for broader reasons derived
from the right to determine one’s own destiny, particularly in the
early weeks of pregnancy.141 The court majority concluded that the
constitutional violation occurred in “compelling a pregnant woman
to continue her pregnancy and give birth even if she faces the abortion dilemma arising from various and wide-ranging socioeconomic
circumstances.”142 The court determined that the existing criminal
prohibitions of abortion would become invalid if the legislature failed to remove the unconstitutional elements by December 31, 2020.143

137. See id.
138. See Sunhye Kim, Na Young & Yurim Lee, The Role of Reproductive Justice Movements
in Challenging South Korea’s Abortion Ban, 21 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 97, 99 (2019).
139. Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Apr. 11, 2019, 2017Hun-Bal27 1, 1 (S. Kor.), http://
search.ccourt.go.kr/xmlFile/0/010400/2019/pdf/e2017b127_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/N223-ELTJ]
(official English translation).
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. See id. at 2, 4-5.
142. Id. at 26-27.
143. Id. at 28.
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Legislation was proposed, with pro-choice feminists favoring
complete deletion of the criminal abortion statutes and others
proposing a statute that tracked the more measured logic of the
constitutional court’s decision, allowing abortion on demand up to
fourteen weeks and then for indicated reasons, including socioeconomic reasons, from weeks fourteen to twenty-four. But the National Assembly did not pass legislation before the December 2020
effective date of the court’s decision.144 Thus, consistent with the
constitutional court’s ruling, the provisions of the criminal code
authorizing the criminal punishment of women and abortion providers for performing unauthorized abortions are null and void.145
However, there remains doubt as to whether the invalidation of
the abortion provision in the criminal code means that all abortions—such as late-term abortions—are legally permitted.146 The
constitutional court ruling did not invalidate the provisions of the
Mother and Child Act, which define the indications for legal
abortion only up to twenty-four weeks.147 Before the effective date
of the abortion law’s invalidation, a doctor was convicted and
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for performing a late-term
abortion on a woman who was thirty-four weeks pregnant. The
Supreme Court of Korea, citing the 2019 constitutional court
decision, recognized that the abortion provision of the criminal code
was no longer valid and affirmed the lower court’s acquittal (on
other grounds) under the abortion provision.148 But the supreme
court also declined to permit the appeal of the doctor’s criminal conviction for murder.149 Whereas the state of abortion law in Korea
144. See Bak Chae-yeong, Abortion No Longer a Crime, and Debates on the Right to Terminate Pregnancy Have Come to a Halt, KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (Dec. 23, 2020, 7:11 PM),
http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?code=710100&artid=202012231911467 [https://
perma.cc/P6EV-ZTRA].
145. 2017Hun-Bal27, at 28 (“The legislature shall amend these Provisions as early as
possible, by December 31, 2020, at the latest, and if no amendment is made by then, these
Provisions will be null and void as of January 1, 2021.”).
146. Kim Arin, Not Illegal But Not Legal: The Murky Landscape of Abortion in Korea, KOR.
HERALD (July 7, 2022, 10:52 PM), https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220707000
805 [https://perma.cc/Q39F-2VHF].
147. Id.; see also 2017Hun-Bal27, at 28 (referring only to the criminal code’s self-abortion
and doctor provisions).
148. Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], Feb. 25, 2021, 2020Da12108 (S. Kor.), https://casenote.kr/%EB%
8C%80%EB%B2%95%EC%9B%90/2020%EB%8F%8412108 [https://perma.cc/AX2S-A4HH].
149. Id.
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remains in flux due to the legislature’s failure to act within the constitutional court’s time limit, the constitutional court’s analysis and
the supreme court’s decision not to disturb a murder conviction for
a late-term abortion indicate a compromise between pro-life and
pro-choice positions.
Prior to these developments expanding legal abortion access,
abortion was criminalized, even in the earliest weeks of pregnancy.
However, these jurisdictions have not embraced abortion on demand
until viability. Instead, the new laws that protect abortion access
resemble those of our peer democracies, where a much stronger
state interest in early pregnancy and parenthood is enforced than
would be permissible under Roe and its progeny.
B. The Indications Approach
The shift from the protection of unborn life to the empowerment
of women facing unwanted pregnancy is not a new trajectory.
Contemporaneous with the period from Roe to Casey, European
countries with majority Catholic populations, such as France and
Italy, or powerful Christian democratic political parties, such as
Germany, legalized abortion in a range of circumstances which
usually make pregnancies unwanted, often through dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches.
This approach, known as the “indications” model, permits
abortion—whether by establishing a right to terminate the pregnancy or by guaranteeing that the termination will not be criminally
punished—essentially on demand early in the pregnancy, ranging
from eleven to fourteen weeks’ gestation. Between early pregnancy
and approaching the viability line (anywhere from twenty to twentyeight weeks), the law imposes procedural hurdles for permitted
abortions, requiring doctors to certify the lawful justifications for
the abortion. These may include averting a danger to the pregnant
woman’s physical or mental health in light of her social and economic situation, rape or incest as the cause of pregnancy, or a serious fetal abnormality. Many of these jurisdictions ban abortion
after viability, with some jurisdictions explicitly recognizing exceptions for medical emergencies in which the abortion is necessary
to overcome a serious threat to the pregnant woman’s life. Because
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most constitutional democracies comparable to the United States
in wealth tend to have universal state-funded healthcare coverage,
the legal frameworks that authorize lawful abortions tend to include—in contrast to Roe v. Wade and Harris v. McRae—the assumption that these lawful abortions will be publicly funded for
the woman facing an unwanted pregnancy.
1. Evolution and Expansion of Indications in Europe
Under the indications model, some jurisdictions involve the State
in judging the reasons for the abortion even in the earliest weeks of
pregnancy, just as the law permits abortions for many of these same
reasons. For example, since 1967, the Abortion Act in Britain
provides that a person is not guilty of an offense
when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical
practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the
opinion, formed in good faith ... that the continuance of the
pregnancy would involve risk ... of injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children
of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated.150

The statute also permits terminations that are “necessary to ...
prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of
the pregnant woman” regardless of the gestational age of the fetus,
and also when “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born
it would suffer from such physical and mental abnormalities as to
be seriously handicapped.”151
Most European countries have similar frameworks, with some
permitting abortions in the first weeks of pregnancy regardless of
the reason, albeit with some procedural requirements, and more
countries allowing abortions for health reasons, as the European
Court of Human Rights has recognized.152 For instance, the certification of distress was a requirement for all abortions within the

150. Abortion Act 1967, ch. 87, § 1(1)(a) (Eng.).
151. Id. § 1(1)(b), 1(4).
152. See A, B & C v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 225-26 (2010).
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first trimester under a 1975 French law that liberalized access to
abortion153 and was upheld by the French Constitutional Council.154
The distress-certification requirement was removed only recently
by the 2014 comprehensive statute on “Real Equality Between
Women and Men.”155 Proponents of abortion rights argued that requiring pregnant women to certify their state of distress was intrusive and paternalistic, even if the State refrained from secondguessing those self-certifications and permitted (and funded) all
abortions that followed that process.156
Nonetheless, the 2014 reform in France did not remove the
State’s intrusions into the woman’s mental and physical state with
regard to abortions after the fourteenth week—when the law only
authorizes abortions that are medically indicated, rather than voluntary.157 The French public health code authorizes abortions for
medical reasons throughout the pregnancy, as long as two doctors
attest that the pregnancy poses a serious danger to the health of the
woman, or that there exists a strong probability that the child will
be born with a serious condition that is recognized to be incurable.158
The National College of French Gynecologists and Obstetricians
recognizes “psycho-social” distress as among the dangers to the
health of the woman that could rise to the level of seriousness
153. See Loi no. 75-17 du 17 janvier relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law
No. 75-17 of January 17 on Abortion], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 18, 1975, § 1 (“The pregnant woman whose state places her
in a situation of distress can request an abortion from the doctor.” (translated by the author)).
154. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15,
1975 (Fr.), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/decision/1975/7454DC.htm [https://perma.
cc/3S3V-FXAL] (official English translation).
155. See Loi no. 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l’égalité réelle entre les femmes et les
hommes [Law No. 2014-873 of August 4, 2014 for Real Equality Between Men and Women],
Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 5, 2014,
art. 24.
156. The minister of women’s rights at the time, Najat Vallaud-Velkacem, noted that
abolishing the distress-certification requirement would bring the law in conformity with
practice, noting that the Council of State had confirmed since 1980 that an actual situation
of distress was not a precondition for women to access abortion. See Elvire Camus and
Jonathan Parienté, Suppression de la Notion de Détresse: Pour ou Contre, Quels Arguments?
LE MONDE (Jan. 23, 2014, 8:02 PM), https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/01/22/notionde-detresse-dans-l-ivg-pour-ou-contre-quels-arguments_4352253_3224.html [https://perma.cc/
S2HL-YXDJ].
157. See Code de la santé publique [C. santé publique] [Public Health Code] art. L2212-1
(Fr.) (authorizing voluntary abortion on request only until the fourteenth week of pregnancy).
158. Code de la santé publique [C. santé publique] [Public Health Code] art. L2213-1 (Fr.).
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justifying an abortion for lawful reasons.159 In recognition of the social and psychological factors that could justify abortions beyond
early pregnancy, a 2001 law established that the interdisciplinary
team to which the question of medical indication for abortion is
submitted in an individual case must include a specialist in the
health risk at issue, an obstetrician, a doctor or midwife chosen by
the woman, and a qualified person bound by professional secrecy
(which could include a doctor, midwife, psychiatrist, or social worker).160 Two out of the four members of this interdisciplinary team
must approve the medical indication for an abortion to be lawful
after the fourteenth week of gestation.161
French law protects legal access to abortion regardless of reason
for the first fourteen weeks and in a broad range of medical situations to protect the pregnant person’s health beyond fourteen
weeks. But it does so without a constitutional right to abortion.
After Dobbs, several members of the French legislature reacted by
introducing bills that propose to amend the French constitution to
protect the abortion access currently authorized by statute.162
The Italian constitutional court struck down a statute in 1975
which had criminalized abortions, including in situations where
the danger of the pregnancy to the physical well-being and mental
stability of the pregnant woman were verified but fell short of the
“necessity” defense to criminal liability.163 The constitutional court
159. IMG Psycho-Sociale Position—du CNGOF, COLLÈGE NATIONAL DES GYNÉCOLOGUES
(Oct. 11, 2019), http://www.cngof.fr/actualites/677-img-psychosociale-position-du-cngof [https://perma.cc/RH49-H34E].
160. Loi no. 2001-588 du 4 juillet 2001 relative à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse et
à la contraception [Law No. 2011-588 of July 4, 2001 Relating to Voluntary Termination of
Pregnancy and Contraception], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], July 7, 2001, art. 11; Code de la santé publique [C. santé publique] [Public
Health Code] art. L2213-1 (Fr.).
161. Code de la santé publique [C. santé publique] [Public Health Code] art. L2213-1 (Fr.).
162. See Proposition de loi constitutionelle visant à garantir le droit à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (June 30, 2022), https://www.assemblee-nationale.
fr/dyn/opendata/PIONANR5L16B0008.html [https://perma.cc/W963-VYJE]; Proposition de loi
constitutionelle visant à inscrire le droit à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse dans la constitition, SÉNAT (June 27, 2022), http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl21-736.html [https://perma.cc/
HGW3-NURG].
163. See Italian Constitutional Court—Decision N. 27/1975: Voluntary Termination of
Pregnancy, BioDiritto (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.biodiritto.org/Dossier/Lost-found-in-translation/Italian-Constitutional-Court-decision-n.-27-1975-voluntary-termination-of-pregnancy
[https://perma.cc/4KVR-LQBU].
ET OBSTÉTRICIENS FRANÇAIS
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reasoned: “There exists no equivalence at this time between the
right of someone who is already a person—like the mother—not only
to life, but also to good health, and the protection of the embryo,
which has yet to become a person.”164
The legislature then adopted a new abortion statute in 1978 to
implement the constitutional court’s reasoning, which begins with
the following preamble: “The State recognizes the right to a willing
and responsible procreation, recognizes the social value of motherhood and protects human life from its beginnings.”165 The statute
provides that, within the first ninety days of gestation, abortion is
lawful in the presence of a danger to the physical or psychological
health of the pregnant woman.166 The statute directs doctors to
consider the woman’s health in light of “her economic, social, and
family situation, and the possibility that the child may be born with
malformations must also be taken into consideration.”167 After fetal
viability, abortions are only permitted to save the life of the mother,
with a requirement that the certifying physician take appropriate
action to save the life of the fetus.168
2. Indications in the United States Before Roe
The indications model is not alien to U.S. law. Before Roe, the
American Law Institute (ALI) included the indications model in
its 1962 Model Penal Code.169 Most of the states that liberalized
access to abortion prior to Roe adopted the ALI approach.170 Section
230.3 of the 1962 Model Penal Code proposed that “unjustified”
abortion should be a felony, with the degree of punishment to be
164. Corte cost., 18 febbraio 1975, n.27, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1975, 43, 201 (It.), https://
www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=1975&numero=27 [https://perma.
cc/EEH7-LSFR] (“Ora non esiste equivalenza fra il diritto non solo alla vita ma anche alla
salute proprio di chi è già persona, come la madre, e la salvaguardia dell’embrione che persona deve ancora diventare.”) (English translation by author).
165. VITTORIA BARSOTTI, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, MARTA CARTABIA & ANDREA SIMONCINI,
ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 125 (2016).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
170. See Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. (Mar. 1, 2003), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2003/03/lessons-roe-will-pastbe-prologue [https://perma.cc/AD3P-RXR7].
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greater if performed after viability.171 But it also defined “justifiable”
abortion, as follows:
A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if
he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health
of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical
or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape,
incest, or other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with
a girl below the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes
of this subsection.172

Only a few states—Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, and New York—
permitted more abortions than those indicated by this recommendation.173
One commentator noted that “physicians have shown an increased willingness to approve abortion on psychiatric grounds,”174
and that, under the ALI recommendation,
[t]o the extent that abortion comes increasingly to be viewed as
a medical question, to be managed by the medical profession—
and given the inclusion of the mother’s “health” (physical and
mental) as well as “life” among the excepting criteria in most
reform statutes—it is quite possible that broad interpretation
could gradually extend legal abortion to cover most (admittedly
not all) abortion-seekers.175

But Roe v. Wade short-circuited this gradual expansion of abortion
access through broad construction of the indications model in the
United States, by pronouncing a negative constitutional right to
abortion on demand before viability.176
171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
172. Id. § 230.3(2).
173. See Gold, supra note 170.
174. Edwin M. Schur, Abortion, 376 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 136, 138 (1968).
175. Id. at 147.
176. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185, 1205 (1992). Shortly before her nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, then-Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg criticized Roe v. Wade because “the Roe decision left virtually no state with
laws fully conforming to the Court’s delineation of abortion regulation still permissible,”
despite the fact that “abortion law was in a state of change across the nation,” with “a marked
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE RECOGNIZING THE PUBLIC VALUE OF
PREGNANCY AND MOTHERHOOD
This Part focuses on two case studies of the transformation of
abortion law, from the constitutional protection of unborn life to
legal, safe, and free abortions in many of the circumstances of unwanted pregnancy. During the time that spanned between Roe and
Casey, a gradual expansion of abortion access emerged in Germany.177 During the decades from Casey to Dobbs, the Irish constitution was amended several times to protect access to abortion. This
Part closely examines the German and Irish trajectories.
A. German Jurisprudence on the Burdens of Motherhood
Germany’s expansion of abortion access was slower than that of
peer nations such as France and Italy, largely because its constitutional court firmly rejected first-trimester abortion on demand as
an affront to the State’s duty to protect life.178 Yet, in so doing, the
German constitutional court articulated a robust conception of the
State’s positive duties, not only to the unborn fetus but to women
facing unwanted pregnancies.179 That reasoning—in the dicta of the
court’s abortion decisions—was central to the statutory frameworks adopted by the legislature in dialogue with the constitutional court that opened up abortion access.180

trend in state legislatures ‘toward liberalization of abortion statutes.’” Id. Earlier in the
article, she favorably cited the Irish supreme court’s decision in Attorney General v. X, [1992]
IESC 1 [1992] 1 IR 1 (Ir.), as an instance of effective and collegial judicial opinion-writing
“even in the most emotion-laden, politically sensitive case.” Id. at 1187. For a discussion of
Attorney General v. X, see infra Part III.B.2.
177. See Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to
Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 274-87 (1995). See
generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
178. See Neuman, supra note 177, at 275.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 275-76.
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1. The 1975 Rejection of Abortion on Demand
In 1974, the West German legislature adopted a new law to
permit abortions.181 The law made it legal for women to obtain
abortions, essentially on demand, in the first trimester.182 The
constitutional court of West Germany struck down this law, declaring it insufficiently respectful of human life.183 In the 1975
landmark decision, the West German constitutional court rejected
the statutory framework, pointing to the State’s constitutional duty
to protect human life under Articles 2.2 and 1.1 of the Basic Law.184
Article 2.2 guarantees the right to life and physical integrity; Article
1.1 declares “human dignity” to be inviolable and imposes a duty of
the State to protect it.185
By allowing all abortions up until the thirteenth week of pregnancy, as though they were purely private decisions immune from
state intervention, the constitutional court held that the State had
neglected the duty to protect life and dignity.186 The court acknowledged, however, that in the case of abortion, the duty to protect the
unborn life had to be carried out while simultaneously respecting
the pregnant woman’s constitutional rights. Every person has the
right to “free development of her personality” insofar as she does not
violate “the rights of others, the constitutional order, [or] the moral
law.”187 Therefore, there would be situations where the “[r]ight to
life of the unborn can lead to a burdening of the woman which essentially goes beyond that normally associated with pregnancy.”188

181. See id. at 274, 274 n.5.
182. See id. at 274.
183. See BVerfGE, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, May 28, 1993, https://www.bundes
verfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1993/05/fs19930528_2bvf000290en
.html [https://perma.cc/HM5T-EWQE] (official English translation). Further citations are to
the English translation. Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision:
A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 551 (1976) [hereinafter West German Abortion Judgment of 1975].
184. See West German Abortion Judgment of 1975, supra note 183, at 609.
185. See id. at 641.
186. See id. at 609.
187. Id. at 643.
188. Id. at 647.
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2. “Exactable” Burdens
The constitutional court acknowledged that abortion should be
permitted when the burden of a pregnancy on the woman would be
too great.189 But which burdens are “normally” associated with
pregnancy, and which go beyond? Abortions necessary to save a
pregnant woman’s life were clearly permitted.190 Going further, the
court framed the question through the concept of “exactability”191:
how much can a State burden an individual woman in order to fulfill its own constitutional duty to protect unborn life? Even when
there was no risk to the woman’s life, the court acknowledged that
“the general social situation of the pregnant woman and her family
can produce conflicts of such difficulty that, beyond a definite
measure, a sacrifice by the pregnant woman in favor of the unborn
life cannot be compelled with the means of the penal law.”192
Although recognizing the possibility that such abortions should
not be criminally punishable, the court rejected the 1974 statute
because it was overinclusive: by allowing abortion simply at the
woman’s choice, it theoretically authorized additional abortions
beyond these “non-exactable” pregnancies.193 The law could legitimize abortions that were justified by a “reason ... worthy of esteem
within the value order of the [German] constitution.”194 A woman
suffering from “material distress” or “a grave situation of emotional
conflict” could be excused from criminal liability, for instance.195
Furthermore, the State was obligated “especially in cases of social
need—to support her through practical measures of assistance.”196
3. The Legislative Response
After the 1975 decision, the West German legislature drew up a
new statute. Taking the constitutional court’s concerns seriously,
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. at 647-49.
Id. at 647-48.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
See id. at 653.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 649.
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the new law in 1976197 recriminalized abortion, except when a doctor
separate from the one performing the abortion issued a nonbinding
opinion certifying that the pregnancy posed a serious danger to the
life or physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, which
could not be averted by other means that the woman could reasonably be expected to bear.198 The statute directed the doctor to
consider the “present and future living conditions” of the woman in
making this judgment.199
In practice, the 1976 law greatly expanded access to abortion200
while remaining consistent with the constitutional court’s 1975
decision clarifying the State’s duty to protect unborn life.201 Doctors
thus certified abortions upon determining that the physical,
psychological, or economic burdens of pregnancy and motherhood
would be unreasonably excessive in individual cases. One German
commentator observed that “almost every pregnant woman could
obtain an indication if she did so with determination.”202
Even under a constitutional jurisprudence that emphatically
rejected abortion on demand in the first trimester, the regime
implemented by the legislature (and not reviewed or struck down by
the court) resulted in 146 abortions for every 1,000 live births in
1982.203 That number is comparable to the United States in 2019,
where there were 195 abortions per 1,000 live births under a
constitutional jurisprudence that recognized a negative right to
abortion on demand before viability.204
197. Fünfzehntes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz vom 18. Mai 1976 [Fifteenth Penal Law
Amendment Act of May 18, 1976], May 18, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1213
(Ger.).
198. See Neuman, supra note 177, at 275-76.
199. See Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 AM. J. COMP.
L. 369, 375 (1986).
200. See id. at 380-82.
201. See Neuman, supra note 177, at 275 (“The legislature complied with the Court’s
decision.”).
202. Eser, supra note 199, at 381. In 1977, 37 percent of the medical certifications for
abortion were for a “medical” indication (physical or mental), and 57 percent of the certifications were for a “social” indication. Id. But by 1982, nearly 77 percent of abortions were
certified based on the “social” indication. Id.
203. Id. at 382.
204. See CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm [https://perma.
cc/S8KZ-CZGL].
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In West Germany, a democratically elected legislature produced
a pro-choice abortion law while respecting, rather than defying, the
pro-life principles enforced by the countermajoritarian constitutional court. A synthesis of pro-choice and pro-life emerged from a
dialogical process of democratic constitutionalism where both institutions tried to pursue the State’s legitimate interest and duties
with regard to human reproduction.
4. Protecting Unborn Life by Supporting Parents
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, German reunification
posed a new challenge for the law of abortion. During Communism,
East Germany had permitted abortions on demand in the first trimester,205 whereas West Germany, since 1976, only permitted those
indicated by doctors for the reasons specified in the criminal code.206
In 1992, the reunified German legislature adopted a new law, the
Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act,207 which permitted abortions
in the first trimester as long as the pregnant woman self-certified
that the pregnancy caused distress to her.208 In 1993, one year after
Casey, the constitutional court for the unified Germany struck the
new law down,209 viewing it as essentially abortion on demand. The
constitutional court reiterated the reasoning from the 1975 West
German constitutional court decision.210
But this time, the German constitutional court gave new meaning
to the State’s duty to protect life by linking it to both Article 6.4 of
the Basic Law—guaranteeing mothers the special protection and
care of the community—and Article 3.2 of the Basic Law—the

205. See Neuman, supra note 177, at 277.
206. See Fünfzehntes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz [Fifteenth Penal Law Amendment Act],
May 18, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1213 (Ger.).
207. Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act], July
27, 1992, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1398 (Ger.).
208. See id. at 1402-03, art. 13.
209. See BVerfGE, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, May 28, 1993, https://www.bundes
verfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1993/05/fs19930528_2bvf000290en
.html [https://perma.cc/HM5T-EWQE] (official English translation) [hereinafter German
Abortion Judgment of 1993].
210. See id. ¶¶ 149-52, 166-96.
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constitutional guarantee of “equal rights for men and women.”211
The constitutional court wrote,
The state does not satisfy its obligation to protect unborn
human life simply by hindering life-threatening attacks by third
parties. It must also confront the dangers attached to the
existing and foreseeable living conditions of the woman and
family which could destroy the woman’s willingness to carry the
child to term.212

The State had a duty under Article 6.4 to “attend to problems and
difficulties, which the mother could encounter during the pregnancy.”213
The government could fulfill its constitutional duty to care for
mothers by “[v]iewing motherhood and childcare as work, which lies
in the interests of the community and is deserving of its recognition.”214 The court continued:
The care owed to the mother by the community includes an
obligation on the part of the state to ensure that a pregnancy is
not terminated because of existing material hardship or material
hardship expected to occur after the birth. Similarly, if at all
possible, disadvantages for the woman in her vocational training
or work resulting from a pregnancy ought to be removed. In fulfillment of its obligation to protect unborn human life, the state
must attend to problems likely to cause a pregnant woman or
mother difficulty, and try, to the extent legally and realistically
possible and justifiable, to alleviate or solve those problems.215

It is noteworthy that the court also refers to “parents,” not only
“mothers.” It recognized that “[p]arents who raise children are
performing tasks whose fulfillment lies in the interests of the

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id. ¶ 171.
Id. ¶ 166.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 168.
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community as a whole.”216 In its view, the decision to bear or raise
children was not entirely private, as the U.S. Supreme Court suggested in cases such as Eisenstadt and Roe.217 It concerned the
community and, by extension, the State.218 Therefore, the duty to
protect life meant that “the state is bound to promote a childfriendly society” in all areas of law and public policy, including
housing, work and vocational training for mothers, labor law, and
other private law areas.219 The court specifically mentioned a law
prohibiting the termination of a lease because of the birth of a
child.220 The duty to protect unborn life also entailed laws “which
make it possible or easier for parents to meet their financial
obligations following the birth of a child.”221 This might involve, for
instance, paid parental leave, as well as access to consumer loans.222
The constitutional court explicitly pointed to the relevance of
Article 3.2 of the Basic Law, guaranteeing equal rights between men
and women:
The obligations to protect unborn life, marriage and the
family and to ensure equal rights for men and women in the
workplace compel the state and especially the legislature to lay
the right foundations so that family life and work can be made
compatible and so that childraising does not lead to disadvantages in the workplace. To achieve this it is necessary for the
legislature to invoke legal and practical measures which allow
both parents to combine childraising and work as well as to
return to work and progress at work after taking a break from
work for childraising purposes.223

216. Id. ¶ 170.
217. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding the right to “deci[de]
whether to bear or beget a child” within the “right of privacy” (emphasis added)); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (finding a pregnant woman’s right to “deci[de] whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy” within the “right of personal privacy” (emphasis added)).
218. See German Abortion Judgment of 1993, ¶ 170.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., id.
223. Id. ¶ 171 (internal citations omitted).
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The constitutional court recognized that the State could protect the
unborn by equalizing the burdens between mothers and fathers and
by providing childraising benefits and paid childraising breaks.224
Put slightly differently, there are many ways that a State can be
pro-life, including by investing in a “child-friendly society.” The
court recognized the value of childcare and suggested that the State
must compensate for it: “Furthermore, the state must ensure that
a parent, who gives up work to devote herself or himself to raising
a child, be adequately compensated for any resulting financial disadvantages.”225 It is fascinating to see how a judicial opinion restricting abortion ends up essentially requiring the State to provide
paid parental leave for both fathers and mothers. While the court
assumed in 1975 that it is reasonable to expect pregnant women to
bear the “normal[ ]” burdens of motherhood,226 by 1993, it acknowledged that even normal motherhood exacts heavy burdens unless
the State intervenes to promote a “child-friendly society.”227
For all the talk of abortion “on demand,” most women who seek
abortion in the United States are trying to avoid the real and often
life-altering (if not life-ruining or life-threatening) personal costs of
continuing a pregnancy when their life circumstances make those
costs too much for them to bear. Many cannot afford to stay pregnant as a financial matter.228 American women may lack health
insurance to cover the costs of prenatal care and childbirth.229
Because pregnancy often interferes with a woman’s education, work,
or ability to care for dependents, staying pregnant also imposes
long-term financial costs that women absorb.230
224. Id.
225. Id. ¶ 172.
226. See West German Abortion Judgment of 1975, supra note 183, at 647.
227. See German Abortion Judgment of 1993, ¶¶ 166, 170.
228. See M. Antonia Biggs, Heather Gould & Diana Greene Foster, Understanding Why
Women Seek Abortions in the US, BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH (July 5, 2013), https://bmcwomens
health.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6874-13-29 [https://perma.cc/6QEL-PG4L].
229. See id.
230. Id. (finding 40 percent of women have abortions for financial reasons and 29 percent
have abortions because they need to focus on their other children); Lawrence B. Finer, Lori
F. Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M. Moore, Reasons U.S. Women
Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 110, 112-13 (2005) (finding primary reasons for abortion are that having a child
would interfere with a woman’s education, work, or ability to care for dependents and/or that
the woman could not afford to have a baby).
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Even in the course of rejecting a pro-choice statute that permitted
abortion on demand, the German constitutional court articulated
two important arguments for supporting a woman’s choice to terminate in most of the actual circumstances that motivate women to
choose abortion. First, that pregnancy and motherhood are burdens
that women sustain to the benefit of society; and second, that if a
woman carries a fetus to term, the State has a duty to minimize or
compensate the woman’s losses in absorbing these costs to society’s
benefit.231
The German constitutional court embraced the public dimension
of pregnancy and parenthood. Childbearing and childrearing involve other people, the society, and the State.232 Whether the State
provides maternity healthcare, paid leave, daycare, quality education, or after-school programs is as relevant to any person’s decision
about whether to bear or beget a child as whether the State allows
abortions or funds abortions. The decision is shaped by the relationship of a person to the community and the State and whether the
State is fulfilling its responsibilities to the persons who do necessary
work to perpetuate the community and to empower the State to
further its goals.233
Once the court articulated what the constitution required of the
state, the legislature responded. When the legislature rewrote the
abortion law to comply with the constitutional court’s 1993 ruling,
it provided that abortions performed in the first twelve weeks,
though “unlawful” in the criminal code, would not be criminally
punishable.234 Health insurance would only pay for abortions whose
lawfulness could be established.235 “Lawful” abortions would include
those performed for medical reasons, including a serious risk to the
pregnant woman’s life or health (including mental health and
suicide risks), or for embryopathic or criminal reasons.236
Because the law since 1976 directed doctors to consider the
woman’s present and future living conditions in certifying legal
231. See German Abortion Judgment of 1993, ¶¶ 166-71.
232. See id. ¶ 170.
233. See id. ¶ 168.
234. See Schwangeren- und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz [SFHÄndG] [Pregnancy and
Family Allowance Act], Aug. 25, 1995, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1050 (Ger.).
235. Id. at 1053, art. 4.
236. Id.
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abortions, social insurance continued to pay for all poor women’s
abortions, even if their “lawfulness” could not be established.237 But
for those with means, health insurance would only cover “lawful”
abortions.238 The new statute in 1995 required pregnant women to
talk to a counselor and give reasons for having the abortion before
it could be performed.239 The practical reality, as was the case under
the 1976 law, is that women can get certifications for “lawful” abortions as long as they are willing to tell the State why they are
getting the abortion.240 In real life, women seek abortions for one of
the reasons indicated in the law.241 Otherwise, women have the
option of “unlawful”—but not punishable—abortion on demand after counseling in the first trimester, albeit unfunded.242 In reality,
over 80 percent of the abortions that take place in Germany are
publicly funded.243
Furthermore, subsequent legislation expanded paid parental
leave for both mothers and fathers, with an eye to policy features
designed to encourage fathers to take more leave than they had
taken in the past.244 Both the legislature and the constitutional
court acknowledged that fathers’ take-up of parental leave directly
affects mothers’ ability to pursue employment opportunities.245

237. Id. at 1054, art. 5. For a more detailed account of debates about and arrangements for
public funding of abortions, largely concentrated in state social welfare programs that
interpret “need” generously to cover the costs of abortions for women in financial need, see
Rachel Rebouché, Comparative Pragmatism, 72 MD. L. REV. 85, 133-34 (2012).
238. See Schwangeren- und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz [SFHÄndG] [Pregnancy and
Family Allowance Act], Aug. 25, 1995, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1050, art. 2
(Ger.); see also Christina P. Schlegel, Landmark in German Abortion Law: The German 1995
Compromise Compared with English Law, 11 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 36, 47 (1997).
239. See Rebouché, supra note 237, at 103.
240. Neuman, supra note 177, at 284; Rebouché, supra note 237, at 131.
241. See Rebouché, supra note 237, at 131-32 (listing common reasons patients provided
at counseling for abortions in Germany).
242. See Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the Application of the
German Abortion Laws, 11 FIU L. REV. 149, 154 (2015).
243. See id. at 157 (citing MANFRED SPIEKER, KIRCHE UND ABTREIBUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND:
URSACHEN UND VERLAUF EINES KONFLIKTES 105 (2d ed. 2008)).
244. See Gesetz zur Einführung des Elterngeldes [Parental Allowance and Parental Leave
Act], Dec. 5, 2006, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I], at 2748, art. 1, §§ 1-2 (Ger.); see also
Nora Reich, Predictors of Fathers’ Use of Parental Leave in Germany, 50 POPULATION REV. 1,
2 (2011).
245. BVerfG, 1 BvR 2712/09, ¶ 5, June 6, 2011, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/
rk20110606_1bvr271209.html [https://perma.cc/Z68D-RKVR].
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5. Insights for the United States
In sum, the development of German abortion law illustrates
(1) that the regulation of abortion is deeply intertwined with the
State’s orientation towards the full range of reproductive activities,
from begetting and bearing a child to birthing and raising one;
(2) that the State is responsible for the way socially beneficial
reproduction affects the mother’s prospects for leading a decent life;
and (3) how the State implements these constitutional values is a
matter for democratically elected branches, guided by the judicial
elaboration of constitutional principles. All three insights are useful
for American lawyers, legislators, and policymakers navigating the
new legal landscape without Roe in the United States. The German
abortion story shows that there are human values other than
privacy, compatible with the protection of unborn life, that can be
deployed to expand abortion access incrementally.
B. The Irish Constitutional Transformation: Tragic Pregnancies
and Citizens’ Assemblies
The evolution of Irish abortion law showcases an additional path
to constitutional change, one involving dialogue between courts,
both supranational and national, the legislature, and the people
themselves. In Ireland, the development of pro-choice policy in a
predominantly Catholic, pro-life nation occurred through the democratic process of constitutional amendment. Popular mobilization
around the public specter of women facing life-threatening pregnancies drove significant changes in constitutional abortion law,
including constitutional amendments.
1. The Pro-Life Constitutional Amendment of 1983
In Ireland, a constitutional duty to protect unborn life was added to the Irish constitution in 1983,246 largely as pro-life groups
attempted to stop the global spread of Roe v. Wade and other
246. For an account of the campaign that led to the adoption of this amendment, see
generally TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND? THE ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 1983 (1990).
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countries’ permissive abortion laws247 into Irish law.248 As the prolife constitutional amendment was being considered and debated, a
woman named Sheila Hodgers died of breast cancer, shortly after
giving birth to a baby.249 During her pregnancy, she was denied
cancer medications due to their potential harmful effects on the
fetus.250 Doctors refused to deliver the fetus early to allow her to be
treated for cancer because such a premature delivery could result
in the death of the fetus and thus amount to a criminally punishable abortion.251 Two days after delivering a baby in March 1983,
Hodgers died.252
After her death, the language of the proposed pro-life constitutional amendment was changed to acknowledge the right to life of
the mother.253 It read: “The State acknowledges the right to life of
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”254 This version
was eventually approved in the referendum that fall and added to
the Irish constitution as its Eighth Amendment, codified at Article
40.3.3.
The Irish people approved the Eighth Amendment of the Irish
Constitution by 67 percent of the vote in September 1983.255 In light
of Hodgers’ highly publicized death in March, it is doubtful as to
247. See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC,
Jan. 15, 1975, J.O. 671 (Fr.) (upholding law liberalizing abortion); Abortion Act 1967 ch. 87,
§ 1 (Eng.); Wet afbreking zwangerschap, 1 mei 1981, S. 1981 (Neth.); ABORTLAG (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1974:595) (Swed.); LÖG UM RÁÐGJÖF OG FRÆÐSLU VARÐANDI KYNLÍF
OG BARNEIGNIR (1975 nr. 25) (Ice.).
248. In 1974, the Supreme Court of Ireland had cited Griswold v. Connecticut to strike
down a statute banning contraceptives. See McGee v. Att’y Gen. [1973] IESC 2 [1974] IR 284
(Ir.). Anti-abortion groups seem to have feared that favorable citation of Roe v. Wade could be
next.
249. See LINDSEY EARNER-BYRNE & DIANE URQUHART, THE IRISH ABORTION JOURNEY, 19202018, at 78-79 (John Arnold et al. eds., 2019); KITTY HOLLAND, SAVITA: THE TRAGEDY THAT
SHOOK A NATION 95-96 (2013).
250. See HOLLAND, supra note 249, at 95-96.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 95.
253. 341 Dáil Deb. (Apr. 27, 1983) col. 1 (Ir.).
254. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983, § 1 (Ir.), https://www.irishstatute
book.ie/eli/1983/ca/8/enacted/en/print [https://perma.cc/GFL7-S6S3].
255. See Brian Girvin, Social Change and Moral Politics: The Irish Constitutional Referendum 1983, 34 POL. STUD. 61, 76 (1986).
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whether the Eighth Amendment would have passed without the language protecting “the equal right to life of the mother.” While some
feminists criticized the proposition that the mother’s right to life
should be “equal” to that of an unborn fetus, an unintended consequence of this language is that it created an opening for a path
to abortion legalization in Ireland, including the eventual repeal of
the Eighth Amendment itself.
2. Expanding the Mother’s Right to Life
In 1992, the Irish Supreme Court interpreted the “equal right to
life” language to permit abortion access for a pregnant girl facing
the risk of suicide.256 In Attorney General v. X, a fourteen-year-old
girl had been raped by an older man, and her parents intended to
travel with her to Britain for an abortion.257 While Irish law enforcement authorities sought to enjoin them from traveling abroad
to obtain an abortion, the Irish Supreme Court ruled that the Irish
constitution entitled the girl to a lawful abortion consistent with
Irish law because the constitutional clause protecting unborn life
also recognized the equal right to life of the mother.258 The court
found that the pregnancy of the fourteen-year-old rape victim posed
a danger to her life because the evidence established a credible
threat of suicide.259 The court read Article 40.3.3 as legalizing abortions necessary to save a pregnant person’s life.260
Faced with a suicidal fourteen-year-old girl who had been raped,
the X case shifted public opinion—and the constitutional text—on
abortion.261 Three proposed constitutional amendments about abortion were sent to the people in a referendum shortly thereafter.262 In
December 1992, the people chose to amend Article 40.3.3. with two
of these three provisions.263 These amendments liberalized abortion

256. See Att’y Gen. v. X [1992] IESC 1 [1992] 1 IR 1, ¶¶ 27, 35-45 (Ir.).
257. See id. ¶¶ 2-4.
258. See id. ¶¶ 4-5, 27, 35-45.
259. See id. ¶¶ 40-44.
260. See id. ¶ 44.
261. See Ailbhe Smyth, The ‘X’ Case: Women and Abortion in the Republic of Ireland, 1992,
1 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 163, 163-64 (1993).
262. See EARNER-BYRNE & URQUHART, supra note 249, at 86-87.
263. See A, B & C v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 203 (2010).
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by clarifying the legal permissibility of travel abroad by Irish residents and citizens to obtain abortions that would be illegal in
Ireland and by protecting the free flow of information about
abortions available abroad.264 Another amendment was proposed
that was intended to limit abortions only to situations where the
pregnant woman’s life—rather than health—was at risk, with
language explicitly excluding suicide risks from this exception.265
That proposed amendment would have been drafted by those who
opposed the legal right of the fourteen-year-old rape victim to access
an abortion in Ireland. The referendum made clear that the public
did not support this extreme pro-life position: 65 percent of the
voters rejected the suicide amendment whereas similar percentages
approved the other two amendments.266 In 2002, another referendum was held to revisit the question of whether suicide risk should
be excluded from the risks to life justifying legal abortions.267 The
Irish voters rejected that proposed amendment yet again,268 making
it clear that they found serious mental health risks to be compelling
as justifications for lawful abortion.
3. European Human Rights Law and the Need for a Workable
Framework
Almost three decades after Hodgers’ death, the life-threatening
situation of a pregnant cancer patient again nudged Ireland to
reform its abortion law in the direction of authorizing the legality
of more abortions. In A, B & C v. Ireland, the European Court of
Human Rights upheld the Irish Eighth Amendment, including the
provisions protecting travel and information, and it declined to
recognize a privacy-based human right to abortion rights.269 At the
same time, the European court weakened the Irish constitution’s

264. See GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T OF HOUS., PLAN., & LOC. GOV’T, REFERENDUM RESULTS 19372019, 48, 50 (2020), https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/32ea7-1937-2019-referendum-results/
[https://perma.cc/9XR9-E56A].
265. See id. at 46.
266. See id. at 46-51; A, B & C, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 203.
267. See EARNER-BYRNE & URQUART, supra note 249, at 87; A, B & C, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 203-04.
268. See A, B & C, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 204.
269. See id. at 255-56, 273-74.
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abortion ban by ruling that Ireland had failed to adopt a clear legal
framework to protect the right to life of the mother when it is
threatened by a pregnancy.270 The cancer patient, Claimant C,
became pregnant while undergoing cancer treatment and sought an
abortion due to the potentially life-threatening risks of continuing
a pregnancy during chemotherapy.271 A, B & C v. Ireland held that
Ireland violated the European Convention on Human Rights by not
providing a legal framework for determining when a risk to the
mother’s life warranted a lawful abortion.272
Shortly thereafter, a woman died under circumstances where an
abortion might have saved her life. Savita Halappanavar was
seventeen weeks pregnant, carrying a baby she wanted to have,
when she went to a hospital in Galway with back pain.273 She was
having a miscarriage, and although her water broke, her body did
not expel or deliver the fetus.274 Because doctors detected fetal
cardiac activity, they feared that removing the fetus would expose
them to criminal prosecution, and therefore, they did nothing to
accelerate the miscarriage or abort the fetus.275 Meanwhile, Halappanavar developed sepsis, an infection of the tissue that her body
did not expel quickly enough during the miscarriage.276 The infection caused her to have a heart attack, which killed her at the age
of thirty-one.277
Halappanavar’s death exposed the stark practical reality of
banning abortions. Even with a legally recognized exception for
risks to the mother’s life, the Irish abortion ban caused the deaths
of pregnant women by chilling doctors from acting in the face of
seemingly unserious health risks that escalated quickly to become
life-threatening.278 By enacting and maintaining this abortion ban,
the State bore some responsibility for the loss of these women’s
lives.279 Halappanavar’s story illustrated how murky the line often
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See id. at 269-70.
See id. at 265.
See id. at 270.
See HOLLAND, supra note 249, at 10, 13.
See id. at 14-15.
See id. at 16, 18-19.
See id. at 21-24.
See id. at 32-33.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 34-36.
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was between risks to the mother’s life and risks to the mother’s
physical and mental health. An infection can remain mild or become
life-threatening in a very short time span.280 Doctors must make
quick predictions and judgments in rapidly changing medical circumstances without fear of prosecution and punishment for acting
in the moment without time to gather all relevant information.
Within a year of Halappanavar’s death, the Irish Parliament
enacted the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act of 2013, which
implemented the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights.281
It created a legal framework that clarified when an abortion to save
the life of the pregnant woman would be legal.282 Abortions would
not be prosecuted if two doctors agreed that there was a risk of
death from physical illness; but in emergency situations, one doctor
was authorized to make the decision.283 In cases of risk to life by
suicide, three doctors’ assent was required, including a psychiatrist
specializing in maternity care and a psychiatrist treating the
pregnant woman requesting the abortion.284
4. Engaging the People in Constitutional Change
Halappanavar’s death did more than simply nudge compliance
with the European court’s decision. Her death occurred in the midst
of a pivotal moment of innovation in Irish constitutionalism, a few
months after the Irish Parliament had established the Convention
on the Constitution285—a body consisting of thirty-three politicians
and sixty-six randomly selected citizens from electoral lists, representing a spread of age, gender, socioeconomic status, working
status, and region.286 The convention was charged with deliberating
on eight topics that were ripe for constitutional reform to make

280. See, e.g., id. at 26-32.
281. Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (SI 35/2013), §§ 7-9 (Ir.), https://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/act/35/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/G92J-C2LQ].
282. See id.
283. See id. §§ 7-8.
284. See id. § 9.
285. 772 Dáil Deb. (July 10, 2010) col. 1 (Ir.).
286. See id.; BEHAVIOUR & ATTITUDES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION—MEMBERS OF THE
PUBLIC RECRUITMENT PROCESS, http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/Documents/Behaviour
AndAttitudes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHC3-RHG2].
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recommendations to Parliament.287 Several of these topics were issues directly bearing on gender equality: same-sex marriage, the
constitutional clause recognizing the role of women in the home,
and measures to increase the participation of women in public life
and in politics.288
Although abortion was not on the agenda in 2012, a discussion of
the social value of motherhood was.289 Questions were raised about
the need to change Article 41.2 of the Irish constitution, which recognizes the contributions of women through their work in the home
and as mothers. That provision reads as follows:
1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within
the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the
common good cannot be achieved.
2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that
mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in
labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.290

The convention did not resolve the issue of amending these clauses
in 2013, but it did propose a constitutional amendment recognizing
marriage equality for same-sex couples.291 The same-sex marriage
amendment was ultimately approved in a 2015 referendum and
added to the Irish constitution.292

287. See 772 Dáil Deb. (July 10, 2012) col. 1 (Ir.).
288. Id.
289. See CONVENTION ON THE CONST., SECOND REPORT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (May 2013), https://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.
ashx?mid=268d9308-c9b7-e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4 [https://perma.cc/UTJ6-TZW9] [hereinafter SECOND CONVENTION REPORT].
290. CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937 art. 41.2.
291. See CONVENTION ON THE CONST., THIRD REPORT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (June 2013), https://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.
ashx?mid=c90ab08b-ece2-e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4 [https://perma.cc/8RHN-7MA5] [hereinafter THIRD CONVENTION REPORT]. Note that, although the Convention on the Constitution
recommended a constitutional amendment guaranteeing gender equality as well, that
proposal has not been adopted by the Irish Parliament for a referendum. See SECOND
CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 289, at 4.
292. Éanna Ó Caollaí & Mark Hilliard, Ireland Becomes First Country to Approve Same-Sex
Marriage by Popular Vote, IRISH TIMES (May 24, 2015, 12:42 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/
news/politics/marriage-referendum/ireland-becomes-first-country-to-approve-same-sexmarriage-by-popular-vote-1.2223646 [https://perma.cc/GF4F-QWCM].

2022]

CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY

495

The initial success of the Convention on the Constitution led
Parliament to establish a Citizens’ Assembly in 2016 to deliberate
on the constitution’s treatment of abortion and climate change.293
Composed similarly to the previous Convention on the Constitution and chaired by Justice Mary Laffoy, a former Justice of the
Irish Supreme Court, the Citizens’ Assembly met over five weekends throughout 2017 to discuss whether the Eighth Amendment—protecting unborn life—should be revised or repealed.294
There was an Expert Advisory Group of law professors, political
scientists, doctors, and ethicists who distributed papers written by
themselves and other experts throughout the nation.295 Experts
were invited to speak on panels to the assembly.296 Small group discussions centered on whether the Eighth Amendment should simply
be repealed or whether the amendment should be replaced.297 If the
latter, one option was to constitutionalize the woman’s right to
choose an abortion, as in Roe v. Wade in the United States.298
Another option was to authorize the legislature to legislate to protect unborn life and women facing unwanted pregnancies, specifying the conditions and procedures under which pregnancies could
be terminated.299 Ultimately, it was this latter option, not a Roeinspired amendment, that prevailed.300
The Citizens’ Assembly spent many weekends considering the
circumstances under which abortions should be legalized, with debates around whether to distinguish between risks to life and risks
to health, serious risks versus ordinary risks, physical health versus
mental health, and whether it was meaningful to distinguish between abortions for socioeconomic reasons and abortions without
293. 918 Dáil Deb. (July 13, 2012) col. 1 (Ir.), https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/
dail/2016-07-13/33/ [https://perma.cc/RHB7-HA9R].
294. Id.; CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY, FIRST REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CITIZENS’
ASSEMBLY 1, 3, 8 (June 2017), https://2016-2018.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amend
ment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/FinalReport-incl-Appendix-A-D.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9VD-EQX2] [hereinafter FIRST ASSEMBLY
REPORT].
295. See FIRST ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 294, at 50-52.
296. See id. at 52.
297. See id. at 17-18.
298. See id. at 20-21.
299. See id. at 20-21, 31.
300. See id. at 25, 31.
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regard to reasons.301 The assembly worked on draft ballots for the
constitutional amendment referendum.302 Ultimately, 87 percent of
the Citizens’ Assembly voted that the Eighth Amendment should
not be retained in full, and 57 percent favored replacing it with a
provision authorizing the legislature to address termination of
pregnancy, including any rights of the unborn and any rights of the
pregnant woman.303
The Citizens’ Assembly heard recordings of interviews of six
women whose lives were affected by the Irish abortion ban, including women who had abortions abroad and women who had
continued their pregnancies.304 Two had wanted pregnancies but
discovered in the course of the pregnancy that the fetus had abnormalities that would be fatal either in utero or shortly after being
born.305 But the other four had unplanned pregnancies, and their
stories illustrated the socioeconomic effects of such situations that
could often last a lifetime.306 Papers presented by the National
Women’s Council of Ireland,307 Parents for Choice,308 and the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment309 also included statistics
and data about the effects of pregnancy on low-income women and
301. See id. at 32-37.
302. See id. at 14-15, 17.
303. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY, https://2016-2018.
citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/ [https://perma.cc/362J6HS5].
304. See CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY, PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS FROM CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY
SPEAKERS: FROM MEETINGS NOVEMBER 2016 TO APRIL 2017 548-70, https://2016-2018.
citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-theEighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Appendix-E-Volume-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9ZGAEX2].
305. See id. at 560-66.
306. Id. at 548-59, 567-70.
307. See NAT’L WOMEN’S COUNCIL OF IR., PAPER OF THE NATIONAL WOMEN’S COUNCIL OF
IRELAND DELIVERED TO THE CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY 2 (Mar. 5, 2017), https://2016-2018.citi
zensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/NWCI-s-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF5S-LUHA] (describing
poverty-based impacts).
308. See PARENTS FOR CHOICE, PAPER OF PARENTS FOR CHOICE DELIVERED TO THE CITIZENS’
ASSEMBLY 1 (Mar. 5, 2017), https://2016-2018.citizensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/Parents-forChoice-s-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9SH-9DPJ] (describing lack of support services and
cuts to social programs).
309. See COAL. TO REPEAL THE EIGHTH AMEND., PAPER OF COALITION TO REPEAL THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT DELIVERED TO THE CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY 3 (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.rte.ie/docu
ments/news/coalition-to-repeal-the-eighth-with-cover-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWB9-XSF4]
(describing impact on women with low incomes).
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families and the inadequacy of State support for parenthood. Citing
recent cuts to the lone parents allowance in Ireland, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development data on childcare costs,
inadequate support for families with special-needs children, and
maternal mortality in Ireland,310 the Parents for Choice paper
argued, “[t]his country forces us into parenthood and then not only
lends no support but actively penalises us when we’re there.”311
The assembly also deliberated on what should be included in
abortion legislation. Strong majorities favored permitting abortion
due to risk to the physical or mental health of the woman (79
percent and 78 percent respectively), as distinct from “real and
substantial” or “serious” risks to life only.312 A strong majority (72
percent) also favored lawful abortions for “[s]ocio-economic reasons.”313 While there was significant consensus supporting lawful
abortion access to avert risks to women’s physical and mental
health, and for socioeconomic reasons, less than half (48 percent)
recommended lawful termination of pregnancy without restriction
up to twelve weeks of gestation age.314
Similar to the German constitutional court in decades prior,315
the Citizens’ Assembly rejected abortion on demand, but they supported lawful abortions for most of the situations that motivated
women to seek abortions—when the pregnancy threatens the life,
health, and socioeconomic well-being of the pregnant woman. These
recommendations shaped the abortion bill that was publicized
during the referendum campaign on the amendment to repeal the
Eighth Amendment.316 The referendum succeeded by a vote of 66
percent.317
Following the referendum on the constitutional amendment, the
Irish Parliament adopted a new statute in 2018.318 The new law
310. See PARENTS FOR CHOICE, supra note 308, at 1-2.
311. Id. at 1.
312. FIRST ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 294, at 32-34.
313. Id. at 36.
314. Id. at 4, 36.
315. See supra Part III.A.
316. See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
317. Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Ireland Votes to End Abortion Ban, in Rebuke to Catholic
Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/world/europe/
ireland-abortion-yes.html [https://perma.cc/HN6V-FFDQ].
318. Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act No. 31/2018), (Ir.),
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permits abortions, upon the choice of the pregnant woman, within
the first twelve weeks, as long as a three-day waiting period is
observed.319 Essentially, this is abortion on demand in the first
trimester, without restriction as to reasons, with the procedural
constraint of a waiting period. Legal abortions are fully covered and
free of charge for medical card holders in Ireland’s public health
insurance scheme.320 Beyond the twelfth week of pregnancy, the law
now permits abortions to save the woman’s life or to avert serious
health risks—mental and physical—following doctor decisionmaking procedures similar to those established by the 2013 law.321
Within a generation, the constitutional law of abortion in Ireland
changed dramatically through the dialogue of courts—both national
and supranational—the legislature, citizens’ assemblies, and the
people through the constitutional amendment process. Pivotal steps
from pro-life to pro-choice occurred at moments when the public was
confronted with a pregnant woman or girl who was likely to die
without an abortion, and some who actually did.322 Privacy—bodily,
familial, or medical—is not what saved abortion access. Growing
public concern and sympathy for what happened to these women
and girls in private did.
5. Abortion’s Relationship to Constitutional Gender Equality
and the Protection of Care Work
In Ireland, the democratic and participatory process of constitutional change played an important role in bringing about the constitutional amendment that opened up access to abortion. After
abortion was legalized, the national conversation about how to value
motherhood while promoting gender equality continued. In 2019,
the Irish Parliament authorized a new Citizens’ Assembly on gender
equality,323 the themes of which are a direct outgrowth of the public
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/31/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8AQF-8PGW].
319. Id. § 12.
320. Abortion, IRISH FAM. PLAN. ASS’N (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.ifpa.ie/get-care/abortion/
[https://perma.cc/HVM6-TKNJ].
321. Compare Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act No. 31/2018)
§§ 9-10, with supra note 278 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 246-77 and accompanying text.
323. See 985 Dáil Deb. (July 11, 2019) col. 4 (Ir.), https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/
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conception of pregnancy and motherhood that has been so central
to developing a more humane approach to abortion access. The
new Citizens’ Assembly was charged with considering proposals
for legislative and/or constitutional change to address remaining
barriers to gender equality, such as “dismantl[ing] economic and
salary norms that result in gender inequalities,” reassessing economic value on “work traditionally held by women,” seeking women’s “full and effective participation” in leadership and “decisionmaking in the workplace, politics and public life,” recognizing the
importance of parental care work, facilitating work-life balance,
“examin[ing] the social responsibility of care and women and men’s
co-responsibility for care, especially within the family,” and “structural pay inequalities.”324
The constitution’s Article 41.2, recognizing the contributions of
women “within the home” as well as the State’s duty to “ensure
that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage
in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home,” was brought
back to the agenda as a provision in need of modernization and
amendment.325 In the twenty-first century, the constitutional
language referring to women “within the home” seems sexist on its
face. As one commentator put it, it is “a quite stunning example of
linguistic gender stereotyping and an appeal to a false universal
notion of womanhood.”326 It entrenched 1937 assumptions that
only women should do household work and that only mothers (not
fathers) have duties in the home that conflict with paid work, as
academic commentators have pointed out for decades.327
Yet in the abortion context, recognizing the losses, risks to life,
and inequalities women sustain because of biological and social
debate/dail/2019-07-11/31/ [https://perma.cc/R8WJ-CHNE].
324. About the Citizens’ Assembly, CITIZENS’ASSEMBLY, https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/
previous-assemblies/2020-2021-citizens-assembly-on-gender-equality/about-the-citizensassembly/ [https://perma.cc/J3MJ-89NY].
325. CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937, art. 41.2.
326. Alan DP Brady, Gender and the Irish Constitution: Article 41.2, Symbolism and the
Limitation of Courts’ Approach to Substantive Gender Inequality, in LAW AND GENDER IN
MODERN IRELAND: CRITIQUE AND REFORM 211, 211 (Lynsey Black & Peter Dunne eds., 2019).
327. See id. at 212-13 (quoting Alpha Connelly, The Constitution, in GENDER AND THE LAW
IN IRELAND 5 (Alpha Connelly ed., 1993)); Dolores Dooley, Gendered Citizenship in the Irish
Constitution, in IRELAND’S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION, 1937-97: COLLECTED ESSAYS 127-28 (Tim
Murphy & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998).
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motherhood was central to the constitutional amendment liberalizing abortion.328 The 2021 Citizens’ Assembly on gender equality
took up the question of whether and how the constitution should
value the care work traditionally performed by mothers without
entrenching traditional gender roles.329 Since its adoption in 1937,
Article 41.2 has been embraced by both gender conservatives and
feminists.330 In the 1980s, feminist lawyers argued in divorce cases
that women who had not contributed financially to marital property
were entitled to a share of the property because of Article 41.2’s
recognition of the value created by women’s work in the home.331
The Irish abortion amendment of 2018 must be understood in
light of the Citizens’ Assembly’s deliberations about the women
“within the home” clause of the constitution that came before and
after the abortion amendment. The abortion amendment of 2018
was part of a larger constitutional transformation about women’s
contributions to Irish life, both private and public.332 The 2013 debates about mothers’ duties in the home were not about abortion,333
but the two subjects are causally connected. The report of the Convention on the Constitution noted that 86 percent of child-care is
carried out by women,334 that only 55 percent of women are in employment,335 and that the absence of childcare prevents women from
becoming more active in public affairs.336 A few years later, 72 percent of the Citizens’ Assembly that convened in 2017 supported the
legality of abortion for “socio-economic” reasons,337 understanding
328. See supra notes 298-313 and accompanying text.
329. See About the Citizens’ Assembly, supra note 324.
330. See Dooley, supra note 327, at 128.
331. In L. v. L., [1992] 2 IR 77 (Ir.), the Irish Supreme Court declined to interpret Article
41 expansively to support women’s economic security in divorce, but Catherine McGuiness,
a feminist lawyer who later became an Irish Supreme Court judge, had argued in favor of the
expansive reading. See id.; Laura Cahillane, Revisiting Article 41.2, 40 DUBLIN U. L.J., no. 2,
2017, at 107, 118-19. A decade later, in T. v. T., the Irish Supreme Court upheld a large lump
sum payment from a wealthy husband to a wife who had scaled back her career in the context
of divorce, with one judge—Susan Denham, the first woman on the Irish Supreme
Court—invoking Article 41.2. See [2002] IESC 68 (Ir.) (Denham, J.).
332. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
334. See SECOND CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 289, at 15.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 25.
337. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, supra note 303.
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that having a baby can disrupt gainful employment and lead to unemployment or poverty. The Constitutional Convention that met in
2013 did not send a specific proposal to amend Article 41.2 at the
time, but the concerns about the socioeconomic effects of motherhood and the inadequacy of state support returned in constitutional
conversations about legalizing abortion.338
The abortion referendum of 2018 appears to have catalyzed renewed energy towards amending Article 41.2. Indeed, there were
some groups that linked abortion liberalization to reform of Article
41.2. The Stay-At-Home Parents Association of Ireland supported
replacing Article 41.2 with gender-neutral language protecting all
parents and carers.339 They explicitly built their case for replacing,
rather than repealing, Article 41.2, by connecting their goals to the
constitutional reform of abortion: “When we voted yes on May 25th,
we were voting not only for the choice to end pregnancies, but also
to being supported with the continuation of pregnancies and for
parenthood.”340 This statement reflects a step in the Irish constitutional discourse towards integrating abortion rights into a broader
vision of reproductive justice. This vision demands State support for
the choice to become a parent, in recognition of the benefits to the
State and society that accrue from its citizens shouldering the costs
of bearing and raising children. This demand is equal in importance
to the negative right to terminate a pregnancy. This focus on the
State’s duties to enable its citizens to parent any children they
choose to have in a healthy, safe, and supportive environment as
duties that are connected to citizens’ rights not to have children
recalls the broad reproductive justice framework that critical race
feminists have advocated for, going beyond Roe and its emphasis on
private choice in matters of pregnancy and parenting.341
The final report of the 2020-2021 Citizens’ Assembly recommended deleting Article 41.2 and replacing it “with language that is not
gender specific and obliges the State to take reasonable measures

338. See supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
339. HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, REPORT ON
PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE 38TH AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION (ROLE OF WOMEN) BILL 75 (2018) (Ir.).
340. Id. at 76.
341. See supra Part I.C.
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to support care within the home and wider community.”342 In July
2022, heeding the recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly, the
Joint Committee on Gender Equality of the Irish Parliament
(Oireachtas) issued a report proposing constitutional amendment
language for referendum in 2023. The Committee presented several
gender-neutral options for expressing the constitutional commitment to supporting care in the home and community for the
legislature to consider.343 It also recommended adding a clause to
the Irish constitution guaranteeing gender equality.344
Beyond constitutional amendments, the Citizens’ Assembly
recommended, by 96.7 percent of the vote, to move over the next
decade to a “publicly funded, accessible and regulated model of
quality, affordable early years and out of hours childcare,” including
by increasing “the State share of GDP spent on childcare, from the
current 0.37% of GDP to at least 1% by no later than 2030.”345 In
addition, it recommended an expansion of paid parental leave so as
to mirror the policies that were pioneered in Sweden and other
Scandinavian countries and adopted by Germany and France following their most recent sex equality constitutional amendments.346
Specifically, the Citizens’ Assembly recommended that paid leave
for parents should “[c]over the first year of a child’s life” and “[b]e
non-transferable to encourage sharing of childcare responsibility
between parents.”347
6. Insights for the United States
The evolution of the Irish constitutional provisions on abortion
and motherhood can shed light on what is at stake in the ongoing
conflicts over abortion bans in the United States. In the absence of
342. CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON GENDER EQUALITY 12
(June 2021), https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/previous-assemblies/2020-2021-citizens-as
sembly-on-gender-equality/about-the-citizens-assembly/report-of-the-citizens-assembly-ongender-equality.pdf [https://perma.cc/B44E-VF8Z] [hereinafter REPORT ON GENDER EQUALITY].
343. See HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER EQUALITY, INTERIM
REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 22-24 (2022) (Ir.).
344. Id. at 10-11.
345. REPORT ON GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 342, at 61, 120.
346. See id. at 130; supra note 241 and accompanying text; Suk, supra note 43, at 24, 29,
35-36.
347. REPORT ON GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 342, at 61.
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law and policy supporting people who become pregnant and parent
the next generation of citizens, prohibiting women from terminating their pregnancies enables the State to profit from the uncompensated work of mothers (through pregnancy, childbirth, and
childcare within the home), both because it produces the citizenry
and workforce and because it more abstractly protects unborn life.
From this perspective, the prior Irish abortion ban effectively
unjustly enriched the State by allowing the State to reap all of the
benefits of maternity without compensating women for its costs,
with adequate maternity benefits, childcare, employment protections, and other staples of mothers’ economic security. Any society
that continues to extract maternity from women through abortion
restrictions is indebted to women who absorb the costs, risks, and
sacrifices of remaining pregnant to produce the benefits of more
citizens and workers that accrue to the society.
In the United States, the new abortion bans that have become
legal after Dobbs force women to carry out unwanted pregnancies
without acknowledging the public value of childbearing and without
compensating or supporting women for their contributions to society. Awareness of this dimension of abortion bans should shift
more public attention towards laws that properly value the sacrifices involved in staying pregnant and becoming a mother.
IV. AMERICAN PATHS FORWARD: MOTHERHOOD AS
PRIVATE CHOICE OR PUBLIC GOOD?
Although it is easy enough to embrace cynicism and lament the
unlikelihood of constitutional amendments expanding abortion
access in the United States under existing Article V amendment
procedures, U.S. law contains underutilized avenues for redressing
the burdens of unwanted pregnancy articulated in Roe and Casey
that deserve closer attention and development in the post-Dobbs
landscape. This Part sketches out these strategies. The most significant is a takings-based challenge to the new abortion bans. Its
theory draws on arguments made by some scholars in favor of
challenging abortion bans on Thirteenth Amendment grounds,
which I briefly consider in this Part. Finally, beyond these constitutional arguments, I propose arguments that abortion providers
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can make, if prosecuted, to expand the exceptions to abortion bans
to protect the health and life of the pregnant person.
A. Building Takings and Thirteenth Amendment Challenges to
Abortion Restrictions
1. The Takings Challenge
The idea that motherhood is undervalued and uncompensated
is not new to the public policy debates in the United States. From
the drive for mothers’ pensions during the Progressive Era348 to the
wages for housework movement of the 1970s349 and the pandemicera calls for a Marshall Plan for Moms,350 some American feminists
have long demanded public compensation for the collective benefits
conferred on society and the nation by women’s disproportionate
childbearing and childrearing load. When a State bans abortion, it
requires the pregnant person to endure a physically demanding
bodily change for nine months, and then it imposes legal parenthood
on her for the next eighteen years, with legally enforceable responsibilities. A law banning abortion effectively extracts physical and
mental labor from women for the benefit of others, often for the
collective public good. This extraction resembles a regulatory taking requiring compensation by the State.
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not “be
taken for public use without just compensation.”351 Scholars have
long grappled with the line between substantive due process (Roe’s
constitutional home for abortion access) and takings.352 A governmental action that causes property loss can either be a legitimate
exercise of the police power or a taking.353 If the latter, there exists
348. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS
424-79 (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1995).
349. See SILVIA FEDERICI, WAGES AGAINST HOUSEWORK (1st ed. 1975) reprinted in REVOLUTION AT POINT ZERO: HOUSEWORK, REPRODUCTION, AND FEMINIST STRUGGLE 15-22 (2012).
350. H.R. Res. 121, 117th Cong. (2022); S. Res. 87, 117th Cong. (2022).
351. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
352. See RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 111 (1985); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial
Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 305 (2012).
353. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277,
284 (2001).
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a governmental duty of just compensation that is owed to those from
whom private property is taken for public use.354 As Joseph Blocher
notes, a regulation registers as a taking when it goes too far, and
the determination often focuses on the property interest that is
being affected.355
To recast abortion bans as regulatory takings, the property
interest of the pregnant woman that is affected must be clearly
identified.356 Once the property interest is established, the State’s
coerced continuation of a woman’s unwanted pregnancy would have
to be plausibly characterized as a public use.357 Then, the takings
claim would contemplate what would constitute just compensation
by the State.358 To begin, the obvious objection to a takings framework would deny the existence of any private property right associated with pregnancy, and it would perhaps question whether
pregnancies, particularly unwanted pregnancies, confer any public
benefit so as to constitute a public use when the state compels their
continuation.
a. Pregnancy as a Public Good
The constitutions of many of our peer democracies, including
those of Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, South Korea, Mexico,
Argentina, and Colombia, either authorize or obligate the State or
public policy to protect pregnant women or mothers.359 Ireland’s
354. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964).
355. In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes said that if a regulation
goes too far, it is a taking. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Joseph Blocher observes that the Court’s
subsequent regulatory takings jurisprudence can be understood through a functional lens,
whereby a largely factual inquiry is undertaken to assess the impact of the regulation on the
property interests, ultimately focusing on the property interests themselves. See Joseph
Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 337 (2019).
356. See Blocher, supra note 355, at 331.
357. See id. at 332-33.
358. See id. at 311.
359. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], § 6.4, translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html; CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937 art. 41.2; 1948
CONST. Preamble ¶ 11 (Fr.); Art. 37 CONSTITUZIONE [Const.] (It.); DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB
[HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 36(2) (S. Kor.); Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos [CP], art. 123(B)(XI)(c), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas
reformas DOF 10-02-2014; Art. 75(23), CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 43. For an account of the origins of maternity
clauses in European constitutions, see generally Julie Suk, Gender Equality and the
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clauses about the woman “within the home”360 and “mothers”361 are
efforts—albeit excessively gendered by twenty-first century standards—to recognize the valuable contributions of pregnancy and
motherhood to the public and collective good. The collective benefits
include the gestation, birth, and raising of a new generation of
citizens and workers, concretely speaking, as well as the State’s
ability to protect life, more abstractly, by promoting a culture of life.
These textual provisions stand in stark contrast to Roe’s vision of
childbearing and childrearing as private zones in which the State
has no strong interest nor grounds for intervention.
Yet the American states that have adopted near-total bans of
abortion have defended their statutes, in legislative history and in
litigation, by asserting a public interest in the protection of unborn
life, even before fetal viability.362 In Texas, S.B. 8 empowers everyone to sue an abortion provider who performs an unlawful
abortion, in an apparent departure from the typical legal requirement that civil plaintiffs themselves suffer a concrete injury.363
Underlying this widely distributed enforcement power is the implicit assumption that everyone is injured when these unborn lives
are prevented from developing into born persons. The statutory
design presumed a strong state interest in the gestation of unborn
life that overrides the pregnant woman’s interest in her own health
and well-being in the course of her life.
Other constitutional democracies also embrace this public interest
in protecting unborn life, but over the decades, they have come to
acknowledge that there is a serious constitutional problem with
requiring the only class of citizens who are capable of getting and
staying pregnant to absorb the full costs and sacrifices necessary to
protect the State’s interest in gestating unborn life to produce the
next generation of citizens. Yet even under the U.S. Constitution,

Protection of Motherhood in Global Constitutionalism, 12 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 151
(2018).
360. CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937 art. 41.2.1
361. Id. art. 41.2.2.
362. The supporters noted, “Enforcing the Texas Heartbeat Act only through civil enforcement by private citizens, not the state, would strengthen citizens’ ability to hold violators
accountable for a practice that many Texans find morally objectionable.” See HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, BILL ANALYSIS: S.B. 8 (2D READING), 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. at 9 (2021).
363. See generally id.
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other situations involving the extraction of public benefits from
private individuals pose a constitutional problem. The Takings
Clause provides the constitutional anchor for such grievances.364
Compelled pregnancy and motherhood are no longer due process
violations after the overruling of Roe, but the extraction of public
benefits from pregnant women and mothers can be challenged as an
unjust enrichment of the State giving rise to a duty of restitution.
Thus reframed, the constitutional problem need not be remedied by
an injunction stopping the State from regulating to protect the unborn altogether; sometimes it is appropriate for the State to offer
just compensation to the individuals who absorb the disproportionate costs of pursuing a public purpose.
b. Property Rights in Pregnancy
To launch a takings challenge to abortion bans, the private property that is being taken must be identified.365 The risks, costs, burdens, and sacrifices of continuing an unwanted pregnancy may not,
at first glance, seem like a taking of private property. Yet three significant changes that occurred in the legal landscape since Roe
make it plausible to view the legally compelled continuation of an
unwanted pregnancy as a taking of private property: (1) the recognition of property rights in body parts and tissue (including embryos),366 (2) the enforceability of commercial surrogacy contracts by
which a woman is entitled to compensation for the renting of her
womb,367 and (3) changes in parentage law, including Safe Haven
laws,368 that have weakened the presumption, in some cases, that

364. At least one commentator has suggested that abortion providers could challenge
targeted regulation of abortion providers (TRAP) laws, such as those requiring abortion
providers to have admitting privileges at surgical hospitals, under a takings theory. See
generally Hope Silberstein, Comment, Taking on TRAP Laws: Protecting Abortion Rights
through Property Rights, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 737 (2017). Shortly after Casey was decided,
one scholar suggested that abortion regulations should be approached through a takings
theory. See Susan E. Looper-Friedman, “Keep Your Laws Off My Body”: Abortion Regulation
and the Takings Clause, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 253, 256 (1995).
365. See supra notes 352-53 and accompanying text.
366. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498-99 (Ct. App. 1988).
367. See infra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
368. See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
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the woman who gives birth to a child is that child’s legal mother.
These legal developments, taken together, support the characterization of a legally compelled pregnancy as the State’s rent-free
tenancy in the pregnant person’s womb.
i. Property Rights in Body Parts and Tissue
This proposition construes the womb as private property. In 1988,
a California court of appeal opened up the possibility of treating
body parts as private property for the purposes of advancing the
common-law claim of conversion.369 In a case of first impression,
Moore, a leukemia patient, asserted a property right in his spleen
after he learned that the doctors who removed his spleen subsequently kept it to develop a cell line which aided the production of
therapeutic and commercially valuable pharmaceuticals.370 Moore
sued the University of California hospital alleging several causes of
action, including conversion and unjust enrichment.371 One element
of conversion is that a plaintiff must establish ownership or a right
of possession of the property at the time of the conversion.372 The
appeals court permitted Moore to allege a property right in his own
tissues, including his spleen, blood, and the cell line derived from
his cells.373 The court acknowledged the need for “prudence in
attributing the qualities of property to human tissue,” noting the
difference between self-ownership of one’s body, on the one hand,
and “being the property of another,” on the other.374 The court
concluded, “Plaintiff’s spleen, which contained certain cells, was
something over which plaintiff enjoyed the unrestricted right to use,
control and disposition;” and “[t]he essence of a property interest—the ultimate right of control—therefore exists with regard to
one’s own human body,” at least for the purposes of a conversion
action.375 The California Supreme Court pulled the brakes on this
theory of private property in one’s own human tissue once it was
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505-06.
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removed from one’s body, but allowed the case to proceed for lack of
informed consent and lack of fiduciary duty.376 But Moore never
settled the question of whether the law might enforce a property
right in tissue that remains within one’s own body.
Furthermore, courts have inched towards recognizing ownership
interests in reproductive material. In Hecht v. Superior Court, a
California court of appeal was confronted with fifteen vials of sperm
which a man had bequeathed to his girlfriend when he took his own
life.377 The decedent’s two adult children urged the probate court to
order destruction of the sperm, arguing that the girlfriend could not
have a possessory interest in the sperm once it left the decedent’s
body.378 The California court of appeal, however, reasoned that the
man had an ownership interest in his own sperm, and his decisionmaking authority over that sperm was sufficient to constitute
“property” within the meaning of the probate code, allowing it to be
bequeathed like property to his girlfriend.379 Courts have also
treated frozen embryos as marital property in the context of
divorce,380 and have enforced contractual agreements about their
distribution upon divorce. Dicta in these cases assume a property
interest in body parts that remain in one’s own living body.381 Thus,
one can characterize the womb as private property. Property rights
would include the right to control its use, including excluding use by
others. Such right of control has never encompassed the right to
injure, destroy, or kill others in the course of controlling and enjoying one’s property. But it does entail the right to exclude and/or
profit from others’ use of the property.
ii. Commercial Gestational Surrogacy’s Transformation of
Legal Motherhood
The rise of commercial gestational surrogacy in the decades since
Roe exemplify a person’s exercise of property rights over her womb.
376. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
377. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 223-24 (Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 226.
380. See, e.g., Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 988 (Conn. 2019); Patel v. Patel, 99 Va. Cir.
11 (2017).
381. See Bilbao, 217 A.3d at 991 (dictum); Patel, 99 Va. Cir. at 13 (dictum).
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In gestational surrogacy arrangements, a person agrees to become
pregnant with another’s child, and to carry that pregnancy to term,
allowing the use of her womb for the period of gestation in exchange
for remuneration.382 The pregnant person is merely the gestational
carrier of the unborn life, which transitions from embryo to fetus to
infant within her uterus; the gestational carrier is usually not the
infant’s legal parent after the child is born.383 Typically, the gestational carrier is not the genetic parent of the child either because
the embryo is often formed with the egg donated or purchased from
another party.384 The evolution of reproductive technology and
surrogacy law have made it possible, if not normal, that neither the
genetic mother (that is, the woman from whom the egg originates)
nor the birth mother (that is, the woman who gestates and delivers
the baby) becomes the child’s legal mother.385 The unique legal status of the gestational carrier—increasingly common in surrogacy
arrangements for childbearing and childrearing—has transformed
modern understandings of pregnancy and parenthood. There is
nothing conceptually difficult about imagining a pregnant person
gestating an infant for the benefit of others in exchange for pay.
iii. Legal Parenthood Under Safe Haven Laws
Even in the absence of surrogacy, where other private individuals
or couples are the intended or presumptive legal parents, not the
pregnant woman, the “Safe Haven” laws that have been adopted in
almost every state since 1999 have also changed the law’s approach
to the parental rights and responsibilities of a person carrying an
unwanted pregnancy to term.386 Safe Haven laws, at least on paper,
reassure the pregnant woman that she does not have to be a legal
mother when she delivers the baby. Safe Haven laws separate
pregnancy from legal parental responsibilities to the newborn infant
and from any liability to the State, so long as the infant is safely

382. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2301-02 (2016).
383. See id. at 2303.
384. Id. at 2302.
385. See id. at 2305-06.
386. See generally Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006).
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delivered to public authorities, typically at a hospital, police station,
or fire station.387
Because Safe Haven laws relieve the birth parents of the duties
and burdens of legal parenthood, Justice Amy Coney Barrett suggested that abortion bans do not impose forced motherhood in terms
of parenting on anyone.388 Because of Safe Haven laws, abortion
bans only imposed the much lesser burden of pregnancy without
parenting, which Justice Barrett acknowledged as an “infringement
on bodily autonomy,” akin to vaccine mandates.389 She was correct
that Safe Haven laws can terminate a birth mother’s parental rights
and responsibilities immediately upon the child’s birth, enabling
women facing unwanted pregnancies to carry the pregnancy to term
without occupying, intending, or even entertaining the role of legal
parent.390 Because Safe Haven laws effectively terminate the pregnant woman’s parental rights and responsibilities almost immediately upon birth, in the same way that gestational surrogacy
arrangements assign legal parenthood to the intended parents
rather than to the pregnant and birthing woman, the characterization of every unwanted pregnancy as a tenancy of the womb by the
child of another becomes an accurate description of the situation.
c. Liability for Nonconsensual Womb Rental
The Safe Haven laws implicitly and in effect make the State the
legal guardian or parent of the embryo/fetus/infant who is occupying the unwilling pregnant woman’s womb. The fetus is being
housed for survival, rent free. In the famous property case of
Vincent v. Lake Erie, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
that a steamship owner could lawfully moor her ship to another
person’s dock without the dockowner’s consent when necessary to

387. See id. at 754-55.
388. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct.
2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392).
389. Id. at 56-57.
390. For example, Texas’s “Baby Moses” law, which was the first Safe Haven law enacted
in the nation in 1999, provides that a court may terminate the parent-child relationship if the
parent voluntarily delivers a child younger than thirty days old to an emergency medical
services provider, who is to take possession of the child. See 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3947-50.
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survive a storm.391 But the steamship owner was liable for damage
caused to the dock, however necessary.392 Similarly, it is the State,
on behalf of the life-affirming society, that owes rent to the pregnant woman whose womb is being occupied without her consent
when abortions are banned. The State’s obligation is even more
acute in jurisdictions that fail to protect pregnant women from the
economic insecurities that come from exposure to pregnancy discrimination and failure to accommodate pregnancy in remunerative
employment, or from high rates of maternal mortality which are
exacerbated by lack of access to affordable healthcare and/or health
insurance.393 The United States has higher rates of maternal mortality than countries similar in wealth and development,394 and
many of the states that are instituting near-total bans on abortion
have some of the highest rates of maternal mortality.395 Within this
landscape, maternal mortality rates are higher for poor women396
and Black women.397
Regarding the pregnancy as a coerced and uncompensated
occupation of the pregnant woman to optimize the public interest,
one may recall the famous violinist hypothetical in philosopher
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s seminal 1971 article, A Defense of Abortion.398 There, Thomson famously raised the question of whether a
391. 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 1910).
392. Id. at 222.
393. See Siegel, supra note 83, at 216-21.
394. Gianna Melillo, U.S. Ranks Worst in Maternal Care, Mortality Compared With 10
Other Developed Nations, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/usranks-worst-in-maternal-care-mortality-compared-with-10-other-developed-nations [https://
perma.cc/9HFG-3H2B]; see also J. Phillip Gingrey, Maternal Mortality: A US Public Health
Crisis, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 462, 462 (2020).
395. Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, and South
Carolina have the highest risk of maternal death. See Sema Sgaier & Jordan Downey, What
We See in Shameful Trends on U.S. Maternal Health, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2021/11/17/opinion/maternal-pregnancy-health.html [https://perma.
cc/E3UZ-UMSG]. In Southern states, one in five women of reproductive age live in counties
with high risk of death and other poor maternal health outcomes, such as postpartum hemorrhage, preeclampsia, and preterm birth. See id.
396. See N. Tanya Nagahawatte & Robert L. Goldenberg, Poverty, Maternal Health, and
Pregnancy Outcomes, 1136 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 80, 84 (2008).
397. See Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in Maternal Mortality, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1248 (2020); MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2020).
398. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 47 (1971).

2022]

CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY

513

person would be morally obligated to limit her own bodily freedom
for nine months in order to save the life of a famous violinist whom
she discovered attached to her by medical tubes for life support.399
The hypothetical assumes, for the sake of argument, that the life
that is dependent on the woman’s forbearance is an actual person
with full rights and capacities, unlike an embryo or fetus whose
human rights and capacities are arguably different and ambiguous.400 Thomson pointed out that “the body that houses the child
is the mother’s body,”401 resonating with my suggestion that the
pregnant woman facing unwanted pregnancy, who intends not to
become a legal mother, is providing rent-free housing to a person
who belongs not solely to her but primarily to society at large, and
over whom the State is the legal guardian. If the State prevents the
pregnant woman from evicting the fetus by way of a safe and legal
abortion with the threat of criminal sanctions or civil bounties for
either the woman or the abortion provider, the Constitution obligates the State to compensate the pregnant person for the public
use of her womb.402
2. The Thirteenth Amendment Challenge
The takings theory is related to another proposal by some
constitutional scholars including Andrew Koppelman to challenge
abortion restrictions as involuntary servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.403 Forced pregnancy and parenthood are
involuntary servitude, and if the State, through enacted laws, is
forcing these services out of women, it appears to be a straightforward violation of the ban on involuntary servitude.404 Challenging an abortion ban under a Thirteenth Amendment theory would
likely lead to its abolition, whereas a successful takings claim could
399. Id. at 48-49.
400. “I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of
conception,” she wrote, in introducing the hypothetical of the famous violinist. Id. at 48.
401. Id. at 54.
402. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
403. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 480, 483-84 (1989) [hereinafter Koppelman, Forced Labor]; Andrew
Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917,
1917-18 (2012).
404. Koppelman, Forced Labor, supra note 403, at 484.
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leave the abortion ban intact as long as the State compensated
women for the use of their wombs. Thus, a takings theory appears
more likely to engender new alliances between pro-life and feminist
advocates. In addition, compensation to carry a pregnancy to term
would likely weaken the characterization of that pregnancy as
slavery or involuntary servitude, which is, by definition, unpaid
forced labor. Successful takings claims against abortion restrictions, requiring the State to fully cover the significant expenses of
every pregnancy and parenthood, might well lead states to rethink
their commitment to banning abortion. Faced with a large number
of takings claims demanding just compensation due to the costs imposed on pregnant women by abortion bans, prudent state lawmakers would have to rethink the costs and benefits of these laws. If
banning abortion cannot be made unconstitutional, takings litigation can make it financially unsustainable.
B. Citizen Participation in Defining the Scope of Life and Health
Exceptions
For a woman facing a pregnancy that is unwanted due to the
adverse socioeconomic and health effects of the pregnancy, a related
strategy for protecting abortion access after Dobbs could engage the
citizenry about these effects, translating some insights from the
Irish evolution of abortion access. Ireland has referenda on constitutional amendments, and its legislature convened citizens’ assemblies to weigh in. In the United States, one constitutional referendum at the state level since Dobbs suggests that citizen participation in the constitutional amendment process can protect abortion
access. Kansas had an August 2022 referendum on a constitutional
amendment proposed by the legislature, stating that there was no
right to abortion and authorizing the legislature to regulate or ban
abortion.405 By a 60 percent majority, Kansas voters rejected the
proposal,406 effectively leaving intact a 2019 Kansas Supreme Court
decision striking down a law banning a second-trimester abortion
405. See H.C.R. 5003, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
406. See Annie Gowen & Colby Itkowitz, Kansans Resoundingly Reject Amendment Aimed
at Restricting Abortion Rights, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2022, 1:12 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/nation/2022/08/02/kansas-abortion-referendum/ [https://perma.cc/8UR9-GUJG].
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procedure based on the state constitution’s protection of women’s
personal autonomy.407 Citizen participation in shaping the law can
also emerge in the United States through juror decision-making, as
the U.S. Constitution protects constitutional rights to trial by jury
in civil and criminal cases.408
1. Expanding the Life-Saving Exception to the Abortion Ban
In Ireland, the constitutional framework that protected unborn
life and appeared to be a total ban on abortions was transformed
not only by lawyers and jurists but also by citizen participation. The
legality of at least some abortions in Ireland was established because of referenda and citizens’ assemblies focused on the pregnancies that tragically threatened the “equal right to life of the mother.”409 The exception for dangers to a woman’s life was expanded to
permit abortions when facing the mental health risk of suicide.410
Ordinary citizens played an important role in the evolution of Irish
abortion law; the referenda on the interpretation of these provisions
showed that even a nation of pro-life citizens supported the legality
of abortion for a teenage girl who had been raped, even if the
majority did not support abortion in all imaginable circumstances.411
Yet, the nature of mental health risks, including risk of suicide,
is such that their diagnosis depends largely on believing the
pregnant person’s own account of her subjective mental state.
Interpreting the threat-to-life exception to abortion bans to include
serious mental health risks thus involved deferring to women’s
subjective experience, which opens the way to valuing that experience and the choices that flow from it. Empathy for women in
difficult situations of pregnancy was central to the Irish Citizens’
Assembly process that produced the constitutional amendment
liberalizing abortion.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019) (per curiam).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 264-65.
See supra text accompanying notes 258-65.
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2. Psychosocial Factors in Risks to Physical Health
Some of the abortion restrictions that have recently been adopted
in American states, such as the trigger laws of Texas and Mississippi, have specified that the threat-to-life-and-health exception is
limited to threats of serious physical or bodily injury.412 Even in
such states, a humane and reasonable construction of that exception
would permit lawful abortions stemming from the pregnant woman’s social and economic situation, if litigated well to establish it.
Authorizing medically indicated abortions only in the event of
danger to physical and bodily health appears highly restrictive on
its face, but data suggest that a range of what the French would call
“psycho-social” factors have a tangible effect on physical and bodily
health.413
When women live in poverty, experience food insecurity or
housing instability, or are exposed to the occupational hazards that
tend to affect low-income jobs, studies show that such conditions
take a measurable physical toll, independent of the mental toll,
during pregnancy.414 In light of these physical health effects, which
sometimes escalate in severity and seriousness in a matter of minutes, as the Halappanavar case illustrates,415 physicians implementing the medical emergency exception to any abortion ban
would have to evaluate the causal connections between social,
economic, and psychological circumstances and the physical dangers of pregnancy.
3. Juries and American Litigation Before Roe
Furthermore, in addition to recent developments overseas, it is
worth learning from the history of criminal prosecution of abortion in the United States in the generation before Roe. Commentators have suggested that, even as many state statutes criminalized abortion since the nineteenth century up until 1973 when the

412. See, e.g., H.B. 1280, § 2, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-4145(2) (2022).
413. See Nagahawatte & Goldenberg, supra note 396, at 80.
414. See id. at 81-84.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
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Court decided Roe, prosecutions and jury trials revealed communities’ empathy for women facing unwanted pregnancies.416
From prosecutorial discretion to jury fact-finding, this empathy led
to court decisions that preserved some access to abortion even
within a legal order that appeared to prohibit it.417
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, the Fourth Circuit in
1941 affirmed a district court decision denying a motion for a new
trial.418 In a case of a doctor seeking reimbursement from his
medical malpractice insurer for his fatal treatment of a teenage girl,
the jury delivered a verdict for the doctor over the insurance
company’s assertion that Dr. Yeatts was barred from insurance
coverage because he was performing a criminal abortion during the
alleged malpractice.419 Although evidence in the record pointed
overwhelmingly to the factual conclusion that Dr. Yeatts was indeed
performing an abortion that caused the patient’s death, the jury
found for Dr. Yeatts, concluding that he had not in fact been
performing a criminal abortion.420 The federal judge refused to set
aside the jury’s verdict and refused to grant a new trial; the appellate court affirmed.421 Written eighty years ago, the Fourth
Circuit decision in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v. Yeatts continues
to be assigned to first-year students of civil procedure as a powerful
statement on the fact-finding authority of juries, to which judges
must defer.422

416. See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW
UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 61-70 (1997) (discussing the “legal loophole” of therapeutic abortions); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 179-87 (1985); see also Schur, supra note 174, at 141.
417. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
418. 122 F.2d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 1941).
419. Id. at 352; Richard W. Bourne, Abortion in 1938 and Today: Plus Ça Change, Plus
C’est La Même Chose, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 225, 228-30 (2003).
420. See Yeatts, 122 F.2d at 352, 355. One scholar who grew up in the community where
this abortion provider had practiced reviewed the trial record and interviewed several surviving members of the community about the case. See Bourne, supra note 419, at 228-47 (summarizing the trial and evidence presented).
421. Yeatts, 122 F.2d at 352, 355.
422. It is included in a leading and widely used civil procedure textbook. See JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 110-13 (18th ed. 2018); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK
S. BRODIN & THOMAS O. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 509 (3d
ed. 2008).
IN THE
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4. Evaluating Threats to Life and Risks of Substantial
Impairment
Thus, juries (and the specters of juries) may well define the scope
of the exceptions in abortion bans. Consider the Texas trigger law,
which permits abortions on pregnant women facing a risk of death
because of life-threatening physical conditions aggravated by pregnancy, or on pregnant women facing a serious risk of substantial
impairment of a major bodily function without the abortion.423 It
remains to be seen how data and evidence on maternal mortality,
for instance, will be considered in determining which conditions are
life-threatening physical conditions aggravated by pregnancy. How
great must the risk of death or permanent injury be to constitute a
life-threatening condition or a serious risk of substantial impairment?
In federal courts, jury unanimity is required to render a verdict
unless the parties stipulate otherwise,424 whereas in some state
courts, a supermajority suffices. In Texas state courts, five-sixths of
the jury must agree to render a civil verdict.425 Available data suggest that a plausible defense of medical necessity to avert a threat
to the pregnant woman’s health can be mounted in many circumstances that lead women to terminate their pregnancies. One of the
reasons most frequently cited for seeking an abortion is inability to
afford a baby at that moment, along with interference with a woman’s work, education, or ability to care for dependents.426 A 2005
Guttmacher Institute study found that these reasons were given in
roughly 75 percent of all abortions.427
Continuing a pregnancy under conditions of socioeconomic stress
has detrimental and sometimes fatal effects on the woman’s
health.428 In many states, including Texas, the lack of a pregnant
worker fairness statute means that employers are not legally
obligated to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant
423. H.B. 1280, § 2, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
424. FED. R. CIV. P. 48.
425. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 292(a). Note, however, that verdicts for exemplary damages
must be unanimous. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 292(b) (applicable to S.B. 8 bounties).
426. Finer et al., supra note 230, at 112-13.
427. Id. at 110.
428. Nagahawatte & Goldenberg, supra note 396, at 80.
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workers for the performance of their jobs in a manner compatible
with their health.429 If the pregnant worker loses her job due to
pregnancy discrimination or the lack of accommodation, leaving her
in poverty, studies show that poverty—often causing food insecurity,
malnutrition, and reduced access to healthcare—increases the
likelihood of pregnancy complications and adverse health outcomes
for the mother, including pregnancy-induced hypertension, hemorrhage, infection, preterm labor, gestational diabetes, and anemia.430
If the pregnant worker continues to perform a job without accommodations compatible with her health, that, too, can increase her risk
of pregnancy complications and maternal morbidity.431
A 2022 Pew Research Center public opinion poll suggests that the
majority of Americans have nuanced, rather than absolute, views on
abortion, believing that the law should allow some, but not all
imaginable, abortions. Only 19 percent believe that abortion should
be legal in all cases without exception, and even fewer (8 percent)
believe that abortion should be illegal in all cases with no exceptions; 36 percent believe that abortion should be legal in most, but
not all, cases, and 27 percent say that abortion should be illegal in
most, but not all cases.432 This points to a significant majority (63
percent) acknowledging circumstances in which the law should protect access to abortion.433 A Vox poll from 2015 found that 53 percent
of the public said abortion should be legal in all or most cases, and
32 percent said that abortion should be legal “only in cases of rape,
abuse, or if the woman’s health is at risk.”434 Only 16 percent in the
Vox poll believed that abortion should be “never legal.”435
429. See Siegel, supra note 83, at 219-20, 227.
430. See Nagahawatte & Goldenberg, supra note 396, at 81-84.
431. Accommodations for Pregnant Employees Act (H. 136): Ensuring Pregnant Workers
Don’t Have to Choose Between Their Job and a Healthy Pregnancy, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://nwlc.org/resource/accommodations-for-pregnancy-related-conditionsact-h-136-ensuring-pregnant-workers-dont-have-to-choose-between-their-job-and-a-healthypregnancy/ [https://perma.cc/6BRG-GFWC].
432. America’s Abortion Quandary, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 6, 2022), https://www.pew
research.org/religion/2022/05/06/americas-abortion-quandary/ [https://perma.cc/XS26-PPF9].
433. Id.
434. Tresa Undem, Why So Many Polls Get American Attitudes About Abortion Wrong, VOX
(Mar. 4-12, 2015), https://www.vox.com/a/abortion-decision-statistics-opinions/abortion-poll
ing-mistakes [https://perma.cc/SP35-RT4Z].
435. Id.; PERRYUNDEM RSCH./COMMC’N, VOX, TOPLINE RESULTS FROM A SURVEY, (2015),
https://cdn2.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/3570070/Vox_Poll_Toplines__2_.0.pdf
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The polling data suggests similarities in the attitudes of most
Americans to those of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly on the Eighth
Amendment.436 While the majority does not support lawful abortion
on demand, a supermajority support the “indications” framework
that is the law of most of the jurisdictions where access to abortion
is safe, legal, and free.437 The exceptions in recently enacted state
abortion bans in the United States, allowing abortions in medical
emergencies, may track this approach through jury fact-finding in
civil and criminal trials enforcing abortion bans.438 In the next
frontier of defending abortion providers in criminal prosecutions
and/or civil damages lawsuits under new state abortion bans without the shield of Roe, a robust, data-driven legal development of the
scope of life-and-health exceptions is an important legal opportunity
to preserve abortion access in the most compelling cases. The experience of other countries shows that firmly establishing access in
the most compelling cases can be a step towards more robust access
to abortion in the full range of cases. Litigating this defense in compelling cases thoughtfully and strategically could lay the groundwork for expanding it over time to include all reasonable abortions,
including those justified by socioeconomic hardships and physical
and mental health consequences of being pregnant under financial
stress.
5. Life and Health Risks and Rational-Basis Review Under
Dobbs
Dobbs held that laws restricting abortion should be sustained “if
there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought
that it would serve legitimate state interests” and recognized legitimate state interests in protecting prenatal life as well as protecting maternal life and health.439 If the life-and-health exceptions
to abortion bans are construed too narrowly in the enforcement of
these laws, resulting in higher rates of maternal mortality or

[https:// perma.cc/8VVC-9WFF] (showing the topline results from the 2015 Vox survey).
436. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 425-29 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
439. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 143 S. Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022).
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indicators of diminished maternal health in those states, it becomes
less plausible that the legislature was reasonable in believing that
the abortion ban would serve its legitimate state purpose. In other
words, only an abortion ban with a reasonable and humane construction of its life-and-health exception should pass rational basis
review.
Litigation is being pursued to expand the exceptions within neartotal abortion bans that permit abortions to prevent the pregnant
person’s death. The Department of Justice invoked the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) to enjoin
Idaho’s near-total abortion ban that had gone into effect after
Dobbs, arguing that the federal law preempted the application of
the state abortion ban in circumstances where emergency medical
treatment was required to protect the life or health of the pregnant
person.440 The district court issued a preliminary injunction, recognizing that the statute requires Medicare-funded hospitals to
provide emergency medical care to protect health, including abortions.441 But it may take more cases involving real people to persuade judges and juries to protect the legality of abortions in order
to protect women’s health beyond those abortions necessary to
prevent imminent death.
CONCLUSION
Human reproduction—both biological and social—is one process
to which women have historically contributed disproportionately
compared to men. The joint opinion in Casey acknowledged this.442
Although it takes both a man and a woman to induce pregnancy
as a biological matter, only women can get pregnant. Only a pregnant female can turn an unborn fetus into a baby, and this biological process exacts a far higher price on her than anyone else.
The deaths of pregnant women in Ireland demonstrated that women do risk their lives and health when they continue a pregnancy

440. See United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW, 2022 WL 3692618, at *1, *5 (D.
Idaho Aug. 24, 2022).
441. See id. at *1-2, *14-15.
442. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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and give birth.443 Gestation, childbirth, and lactation also exact an
economic price from women because they cannot work to the same
extent during this process not only due to the physical toll on women’s bodies but also due to discrimination and other social dynamics
that reduce pregnant workers’ labor power. For these reasons, a
woman who continues a pregnancy, wanted or unwanted, bears an
unequal burden for a pregnancy that a man has played an equal
part in begetting and from which society and the state will benefit.
When she gives birth to a live human being, the child is not only her
offspring but also a future citizen and contributor to the society’s
continued economic, social, and political survival and flourishing.
The community gains a new living member, but the mother has
foregone opportunities for economic security and the development
of her personality to do the demanding and dangerous essential
work that turns the unborn life into a born, live, and productive
person.
The laws of abortion in an increasing number of jurisdictions
appreciate the fundamentally social nature of a woman’s decision to
become a mother. Abortion is not only a decision about one’s private
parts; it is a decision about how a woman wants her life to go, and
whether doing what it takes to turn a fetus into a child, and then to
turn a child into a citizen, is going to hamper her from being a full
person and citizen in her own right. The State can make a huge
difference in what unfolds. If doing what it takes to turn the fetus
into a child can actually ruin the woman’s health—physical, mental,
or economic—an increasing number of constitutional democracies
recognize the State’s duty to prevent it. Allowing—and funding—
abortion is one way that the State can fulfill its responsibility to the
woman citizen. But there are additional ways. The State can also
ensure that pregnancy and motherhood do not ruin women’s lives.
The State can prevent mothers from living a life of economic insecurity. It can implement policies reducing maternal mortality,
providing maternity care and paid maternity leave, ensuring that
pregnant women and mothers are not deprived of economic opportunities, and providing childcare and education. Enabling mothers
to live a decent life with economic security inures to the benefit of

443. See supra Part III.B.
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the child, both in utero and after birth, as well as to the society to
which the child contributes eventually. The State’s duties stem from
the benefits that society derives from women staying pregnant and
becoming mothers.
Abortion bans assume that women’s sacrifices, to quote Justice
Blackmun in his Casey concurrence, are the “natural” status and
incidents of motherhood.444 Abortion access beyond Roe will depend
on changing public understandings of the social dimensions of
pregnancy and motherhood. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt445 and June Medical Services v. Russo,446 highly accomplished
women lawyers and law professors filed amicus briefs urging the
Supreme Court to uphold Roe v. Wade and the constitutional right
to choose an abortion, arguing that their own abortions at pivotal
moments of their educational or professional lives enabled their
educational and professional success.447 Abortions enabled each of
them to keep studying, to become lawyers, to become law professors,
to become leaders, to become wealthy, and to live the lives that
match their talents, skills, and dreams.448
These amicus briefs tap into a deep feminist ambivalence about
the inequalities women face in society because of pregnancy and
motherhood. The impressive careers that abortion helped these
women achieve is inspiring; yet a society that allows pregnancy and
motherhood to derail women’s paths to economic security and
independence is troubling. The United States has high rates of
maternal mortality relative to its peer wealthy nations and is one of
the few countries in the world that does not guarantee accommodations for pregnant workers on the job, paid maternity leave,
or universal free or affordable childcare.449 Millions of women in
444. See 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
445. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
446. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
447. Brief of Janice Macavoy, Janie Schulman, and Over 110 Other Women in the Legal
Profession Who Have Exercised Their Constitutional Right to an Abortion as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No 15-274 (5th Cir. 2016); Brief for
Michele Coleman Mayes, Claudia Hammerman, Charanya Krishnaswami, and 365 Other
Legal Professionals Who Have Exercised Their Constitutional Right to an Abortion as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, June Med. Servs. v. Gee, Nos. 18-1323 and No. 18-1460 (5th
Cir. 2019).
448. See supra note 449.
449. See supra notes 356-58, 391 and accompanying text.
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America are far less privileged than the lawyers and law professors
who filed the briefs, and despite Roe’s respect for their privacy,
many American women have had no meaningful access to abortion
due to lack of available services and funding.450
Permitting abortions in the range of circumstances now permitted
by many peer democracies is necessary, but not sufficient, for real
reproductive freedom. Permitting but not funding abortions in an
even broader range of circumstances, as Roe did, is not necessary,
sufficient, or helpful. A full and fair valuation of society’s gains and
women’s losses in pregnancy and motherhood is needed.
Experiences of peer constitutional democracies, notably Germany
and Ireland, indicate that resolving these issues is not a job for
courts alone. In Germany, the legislature rewrote abortion laws by
doing as much as it could with the court’s pro-choice dicta about the
dignity and equality of mothers.451 Keeping abortion safe and legal
in America will require engaging most of the American people, who
are ambivalent rather than dogmatic about abortion. They want the
law to protect unborn life and save women from pregnancies that
make their lives significantly worse, but they feel moral discomfort
with abortion on demand. American democracy is in need of new
paths by which government can respond to the people’s commitment
to protecting life without forcing women to bear the brunt of that
collective goal. Whether through constitutional litigation that recognizes the public interest in pregnancy and parenthood, jury
decision-making in the enforcement of abortion laws, or legislation
that funds justified abortions and supports mothers through
pregnancy and birth, a world of abortion access is possible without
Roe, but only if our constitutional democracy embraces a much
broader vision of the State’s role in making reproductive freedom
real.

450. Dan Keating, Tim Meko & Danielle Rindler, Abortion Access Is More Difficult for
Women in Poverty, WASH. POST (July 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
2019/07/10/abortion-access-is-more-difficult-women-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/6PKG-48F3].
451. See supra Part III.A.

